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MANUFACTURING PROSPERITY 
A Bold Strategy for National Wealth and Security
Offshore production in advanced manufacturing has reached a critical point in which the strategy of 
“invent here, manufacture there” has become “invent there, manufacture there.” The United States 
must take bold steps to arrest this development and take advantage of transformational technologies 
to rebuild domestic manufacturing prowess for national wealth and security. These bold steps require 
a central national focal point with a comprehensive strategy, and significant and sustained public and 
private investments:
1. Invest in translational research and manufacturing innovation
2. Encourage domestic pilot production and scale-up
3. Empower small and medium-sized manufacturers to deploy advanced technologies
4. Grow domestic engineering and technical talent
Positive national impacts will justify the needed investments. The United States will
1. regain fundamental manufacturing capabilities, 
2. ensure a return on federal investments in R&D, 
3. capitalize on technology changes broadly affecting manufacturing, 
4. establish leadership in new industries of the future, and 
5. restore the broad-based supplier networks that are essential to economic and national 
security. 
Because of a confluence of economic and technological forces, the United States now has an 
opportunity to rebuild its manufacturing base and restore its global competitiveness. But another report 
will not help. Bold steps commensurate with the scale and importance of the objectives are absolutely 
necessary. Implementing these bold steps requires a national focal point of responsibility with a 
comprehensive strategy and significant and sustained public and private investments. Other countries 
are not standing still. The onus is on us.
IV
FOREWORD
American manufacturing faces both daunting challenges and transformative opportunities. Ensuring 
national security, preserving the nation’s innovation edge, sustaining jobs, and maintaining global 
manufacturing leadership will require foresight, skillful cross-sector thinking, and serious investments. 
In early 2018, MForesight: Alliance for Manufacturing Foresight conducted a series of roundtables with 
manufacturing experts, business leaders, and policymakers in cities across the United States. The 
objective was to gather perspective from multiple regions with industry clusters ranging from advanced 
technology sectors, such as electronics, biotechnology, and advanced materials, to large traditional, 
albeit still advanced sectors such as automotive, construction equipment, and food processing. 
Roundtables were held in Austin, Boston, Detroit, Indianapolis, Raleigh, San Jose, and Washington, D.C. 
To focus the discussion, participants were provided with information on trends in trade, value added, 
employment, foreign direct investment, research, start-ups, investment, and other key indicators on the 
state of U.S. manufacturing. 
Roundtable discussions focused on several key questions:
1.  Regaining America’s Industrial Commons: What foundational capabilities are essential for the  
     United States to regain a global leadership position and to ensure the strength of the defense supply      
     chain? How can the United States strengthen its ecosystem of manufacturing expertise and  
     production capacities in key sectors?
2.  Capitalizing on national investments in research and development (R&D): What steps are  
     needed to ensure that America captures the wealth generated from new products and processes
     emerging from its large national R&D spending? How can the United States achieve first-mover
     advantage in research-intensive advanced technology products?  
3.  Ensuring financing for hardware start-ups and scale-ups: What policies and programs would
     increase opportunities for manufacturing start-ups to thrive, scale their operations, and root
     production in this country?
These questions are at the heart of the grand challenges facing U.S. manufacturing. Roundtable 
participants were asked to identify actionable recommendations for both public and private 
stakeholders that would meet these challenges. Their assessment of the urgency of the challenges 
and recommendations are presented in this report. Because so much information was gathered about 
multiple industries, research programs, and competing national strategies, this report is the first of 
several on grand challenges forthcoming from MForesight.
Advances in production technology are changing manufacturing, presenting an opportunity for dramatic 
change that can restore national production for both defense and economic security. But, as more than 
100 roundtable participants agreed, another report will not restore U.S. manufacturing competitiveness. 
Bold initiatives, with full understanding of the multi-faceted nature of the challenges, are necessary. The 
recommendations in this report include such bold steps.
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1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
American manufacturing faces both daunting challenges and transformative opportunities. 
As production has moved offshore over recent decades, manufacturers have steadily moved research 
and development (R&D) activities offshore as well to be close to the factories where product and 
process engineering skills reside. These shifts have come with serious consequences. America has 
seen a decline in its ability to manufacture new advanced technology products. Rebuilding capacity 
in advanced industries is essential to achieving long-term prosperity, ensuring national security, and 
preserving the nation’s innovation edge. Doing so will require foresight, skillful cross-sector thinking, and 
serious investments. 
New opportunities are also emerging: extensive, pervasive technological change in manufacturing 
should create a positive future for domestic production. The new parameters play to American strengths:
 
 ■ flexibility and adaptability, 
 ■ a large capital market, 
 ■ superior higher education, and 
 ■ world-leading R&D. 
But recapturing industrial leadership will require recognition of the importance of manufacturing and a 
focus on launching the industries of the future. 
In early 2018, MForesight: Alliance for Manufacturing Foresight conducted a series of roundtables 
with manufacturing experts, business leaders, academic researchers, entrepreneurs, investors, and 
policymakers in cities across the United States. The objective was to gather perspective on the current 
state of U.S. manufacturing, the grand challenges facing U.S. manufacturing, and actions that the 
public and private sectors should take to meet those challenges. Their assessment of the urgency of the 
challenges and steps to meet them informed the critical next steps identified in this report.
Grand Challenges in U.S. Manufacturing
A simple articulation of the grand challenges that must be addressed to capture this prosperous future 
include:
      1.  Rebuild the Industrial Commons 
The United States has lost fundamental production skills and capabilities—the Industrial Commons—
in many industries.1 This has meant the loss of entire industrial sectors over time, with noticeable 
impacts on the national innovation system. Production can provide competitive advantages that are 
difficult to replicate. Maintaining domestic manufacturing capabilities is essential to retaining the 
know-how needed to produce next generation technologies and to meet critical defense production.
1 Pisano, G. P., & Shih, W. C. (2009). Restoring American competitiveness. Harvard Business Review, (July - August). 
Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2009/07/restoring-american-competitiveness; Pisano, G. P., & Shih, W. C. (2012). Producing 
prosperity: Why America needs a manufacturing renaissance. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business Review Press.
2      2.  Convert national R&D to national wealth and security
Leading the world in R&D spending is not sufficient to ensure prosperity. Technologies invented 
here are being licensed, sold, or given away to manufacture overseas, which, in effect, is 
subsidizing R&D for other countries. Results of R&D should be strategically nurtured to create new 
products, including defense-critical technology products, that are made in America at commercial 
scale to generate wealth, jobs, and exports. 
      3.  Lead emerging industries 
To ensure future economic strength and defense superiority, the United States must have a 
leadership position in emerging industries such as autonomous vehicles, robotics, multi-material 
additive manufacturing, bio-manufacturing, energy storage, advanced materials, and quantum 
computing, to name a few. Dependence on foreign suppliers is creating defense vulnerabilities and 
significant long-term costs. 
Bold steps are needed to ensure that these challenges are met quickly and aggressively. Market 
forces alone are unlikely to achieve the needed change. They have not so far. With sustained, strategic 
investments, the United States can 
 ■ regain fundamental manufacturing capabilities, 
 ■ ensure a return on federal investments in R&D, 
 ■ capitalize on technology changes broadly affecting manufacturing, 
 ■ establish leadership in new industries, and 
 ■ restore the broad-based supplier networks that are essential to economic and national security.
Restoring U.S. manufacturing leadership and, perhaps more importantly, restoring the nation’s ability to 
capture wealth from the national innovation system with a robust manufacturing base, is a challenge to 
both the private and public sectors. Manufacturers, driven by short-term financial incentives, primarily 
focus on applied research and incremental product development rather than the translational research 
needed to commercialize basic research results to capture the “next big thing.” Only government can 
overcome this market failure to ensure that the United States remains globally competitive. 
Critical Next Steps
Addressing these grand challenges in manufacturing will require concerted effort from the nation’s 
public and private sectors. Critical next steps include:
      1.  Invest in translational research and manufacturing innovation
The innovation cycle that converts R&D results—new inventions and discoveries—into successful 
commercial products may be working well in software, but it is subject to significant failures with 
regard to manufactured hardware. Funding for the translational research needed to develop 
operational prototypes, demonstrate manufacturability, and identify viable markets is frequently 
unavailable. Promising technologies languish in laboratories. Funding and expertise is needed to fill 
this gap. Effective investment can result in more prototyped and demonstrated products, reducing 
3technical and market risks and boosting commercialization and production.
      2.  Encourage pilot production and scale-up
To restore domestic production and overall leadership in emerging industries, America needs to 
invest in advancing manufacturing technologies, increasing pilot production, and scaling up to 
viable commercial volume. In some cases—semiconductor packaging and pharmaceuticals are 
examples—new production technologies are creating opportunities for U.S. industry to regain 
leadership. In others, commercial scale production can be achieved by ensuring patient capital is 
available and demand is sufficient. Leveraging government procurement is an effective tool.
      3.  Empower small and medium-sized manufacturers
While these manufacturers form the backbone of industrial supply chains, they tend to implement 
new technologies slowly. There is a pressing need for mechanisms to accelerate the use of smart 
manufacturing technologies, increase their access to necessary expertise, and build better links 
between market demands for production capability and their ability to provide it. Mechanisms are 
also needed to increase small firms’ capacity to commercialize research results, such as simple 
licensing agreements that will encourage technology transfer from universities.
      4.  Grow domestic engineering and technical talent
To rebuild the Industrial Commons, a combination of incentives could increase the number of 
manufacturing apprenticeship programs, train engineering technicians with applied engineering 
skills, and entice capable domestic graduates to pursue advanced degrees to overcome America’s 
dependence on foreign graduate students in key scientific and engineering fields. 
The United States needs a broad national conversation to identify the necessary steps to achieve these 
objectives. At MForesight’s roundtables, diverse stakeholders presented a number of promising ideas, 
including establishing a “focal point” office in the federal government for leveraging the strengths and 
outcomes of different agencies to mature Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) and manufacturing 
research to mature Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs) so that emerging technologies can be 
manufactured domestically at commercial scale. Other ideas included establishing university-affiliated 
Translational Research Centers, launching special competitions focused on manufacturing challenges, 
creating industry fellowships to harness the expertise of retired manufacturing experts, and building the 
financial resources to increase investment in hardware start-ups and scale-ups, among other ideas. 
Implementation Options
These ideas should be part of a comprehensive national strategy, ideally implemented in a coordinated 
way with a single point of focus to orchestrate the required funding streams and to maintain strategic 
program management. The roundtable participants proposed a few implementation options, including 
creating a national innovation initiative, establishing a national manufacturing innovation foundation, 
and establishing a manufacturing program within each of the federal science and technology agencies. 
They fully expect the policymakers to convene and make decisions on how best to implement the critical 
steps identified in the previous section. A piecemeal approach, addressing one or two critical steps but 
not all, will not help.
4Conclusions
1.  Manufacturing really matters for economic and national security.
2.  Being the best in the world in scientific discoveries and engineering inventions is critical but not
     sufficient to ensure national prosperity. 
3.  Manufacturing and innovation are intricately linked. Reaping the full rewards of rapid technological
     advances, the nation must manufacture today’s advanced technology products so it can innovate
     next generation products.
Because of a confluence of economic and technological forces, the United States now has an 
opportunity to rebuild its manufacturing base and restore its global competitiveness. But another report 
will not help. Bold steps commensurate with the scale and importance of the objectives are absolutely 
necessary. Other countries are not standing still. The onus is on us. 
5INTRODUCTION
“If any particular manufacture was necessary, indeed, for the defense of the society it might not always 
be prudent to depend upon our neighbors for the supply.” 
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776
Advanced technology manufacturing industries 
in the United States are in a precarious position. 
After decades of shifting production offshore 
to reduce labor costs, fundamental production 
skills and capabilities have been lost; domestic 
suppliers of essential parts and components 
are unavailable; and the ability to manufacture 
new advanced technology products is severely 
constrained. As production has moved offshore, 
manufacturers are moving more research 
and development (R&D) to be close to the 
factories where the product and process 
engineering skills reside. The implications for 
future technology leadership, economic growth, 
and national security are dire. Maintaining the 
trajectory of recent decades—a shrinking 
manufacturing base and large trade deficits 
in advanced technologies—will result in a 
second tier industrial economy, unable to 
maintain superiority in defense or global 
economic leadership. Signs of this ominous 
future are already apparent.
Fortunately, the possibility of a competitive, 
prosperous future is also apparent. Extensive 
and pervasive technological change in 
manufacturing is creating an opportunity 
to ensure a positive future for domestic 
production. The coming decades promise a 
much more responsive, flexible, and intelligent 
manufacturing sector. Small batch, customized, 
local production will be both feasible and 
necessary to meet evolving consumer demand. 
These advanced manufacturing technologies 
are shifting the basis for competitive production 
in many industries, away from low-cost labor 
inputs toward effective use of smart, digital, 
flexible production. This manufacturing 
revolution is shifting priorities for skill 
development, capital investment, production 
location, product features, and multiple other 
parameters that were once common wisdom. 
The new parameters play to American 
strengths: flexibility and adaptability, a large 
capital market, superior higher education, 
6and the world’s best R&D. In fact, Deloitte 
projects that the United States will top its 
Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index 
in 2020, ahead of China, largely based on 
implementation of advanced manufacturing 
technologies and a shift to higher value, more 
sophisticated products.2 But taking advantage 
of these strengths to recapture industrial 
leadership will require national recognition of 
the importance of manufacturing and a focus on 
building the industries of the future.
Grand Challenges in U.S. 
Manufacturing
Despite the federal government investing over 
$140 billion in R&D year after year, annual U.S. 
trade deficits in advanced technology products 
continue to hover around $100 billion. Federal 
science and technology (S&T) agencies and 
American universities and national laboratories 
funded by them continue to be successful in 
developing promising scientific discoveries 
and inventions. However, in too many cases, 
foreign governments and investors have been 
taking advantage of promising results, building 
large production capacity, and exporting the 
products back here. Consumer electronics, 
personal computers and laptops, lithium-ion 
batteries, flat panel displays, photovoltaics, 
nanotechnology, and biomanufacturing are all 
examples. American taxpayers have funded 
the basic research, only to create wealth and 
jobs elsewhere. Fixing this gaping hole in the 
nation’s innovation ecosystem requires that 
the United States make the investments being 
made by competing countries—investment 
in engineering and manufacturing processes 
2 Deloitte & U.S. Council on Competitiveness. (2016). 2016 global manufacturing competitiveness index. Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu Limited. Retrieved from https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/manufacturing/articles/global-
manufacturing-competitiveness-index.html
3 Pisano, G. P., & Shih, W. C. (2009). Restoring American competitiveness. Harvard Business Review, (July - August). 
Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2009/07/restoring-american-competitiveness; Pisano, G. P., & Shih, W. C. (2012). Producing 
prosperity: Why America needs a manufacturing renaissance. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business Review Press.
and equipment. Science is not engineering. 
Distinct from science, engineering means not 
just analysis and discovery but synthesis and 
innovation aimed at turning promising, albeit 
abstract, ideas into tangible new products and 
processes. Committing additional investment 
funds to translate promising discoveries and 
inventions into commercial products will be an 
essential step in restoring U.S. leadership (and 
the trade balance) in advanced technologies. 
 
The longer the status quo continues, the 
more difficult and expensive solutions will 
become. Understanding the extent of the 
problem should motivate action now. A 
simple articulation of the grand challenges that 
must be addressed to capture a prosperous 
future include:
Rebuilding the Industrial Commons: The 
United States has lost fundamental production 
skill and capabilities—the Industrial Commons—
in many industries and has lost entire industrial 
sectors, with noticeable impacts on the national 
innovation system. Gary Pisano and Willy Shih, 
professors at Harvard, identified the importance 
of the Industrial Commons and raised an alarm 
about its loss in 2009(!).3 Many of the industries 
they identified as “at risk” then, such as 
electronic displays and mobile handsets, have 
already been lost.
Gaining competitive advantage from 
manufacturing: Production can provide 
competitive advantages that are difficult to copy 
and have long-term sustainability. There is a 
difference between parts and assemblies that 
become commodities as technology advances 
and manufacturing capabilities that become 
devalued as a source of competitive advantage 
7because Asian manufacturers, backed by 
mercantilist government policies, offer to 
produce for little or no margins. Maintaining 
domestic manufacturing capabilities is essential 
to retaining the know-how needed to produce 
next-generation technologies, and to retaining 
critical defense production.
Converting U.S. R&D to national wealth 
and security: Leading the world in R&D 
spending does not ensure prosperity or national 
security. The nature of research is such that 
a relatively small percentage results in the 
potential for new products, processes, even 
entire industries. These promising results must 
be nurtured to commercialize them in this 
country to generate wealth, jobs, and exports. 
Too often, once a discovery is proven in the 
laboratory, funding dries up. New inventions 
either languish for lack of funding to develop 
proof-of-concept prototypes; cannot be 
manufactured domestically for lack of capital, 
skills, or production capabilities; or are made in 
China. Technologies invented here are being 
licensed, sold, or given away to manufacture 
overseas, which, in effect, is doing R&D for 
other countries. The United States needs both 
a national strategy and effective mechanisms to 
build wealth through manufacturing promising 
research results rather than allow foreign entities 
to cherry-pick winners.
Capturing the gains from new manufacturing 
technologies: Advances in technologies 
ranging from high-performance materials 
to ubiquitous sensors, from self-correcting 
robots/machines to autonomous factories, 
will transform both products and processes. 
Maximizing the benefits will require rapid, broad 
implementation, which in turn will require 
that the necessary equipment and tools, talent 
and skills are available especially to small and 
medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs). Adoption 
of “smart manufacturing” technologies has been 
too slow to date. Resources, incentives, and 
support must be mobilized to move quickly, 
learn from mistakes, and sustain successes 
across all tiers and industries.
Leading emerging industries: To ensure future 
economic strength and defense superiority, the 
United States must have a leadership position 
in emerging industries such as autonomous 
vehicles, robotics, metal-additive manufacturing, 
biomanufacturing, energy storage, advanced 
materials, and quantum computing, to name 
a few. Dependence on foreign suppliers, 
regardless of how much cheaper they may be, 
is creating defense vulnerabilities and long-
term competitive disadvantages. Labor cost 
differentials across countries are shrinking and 
direct labor is rarely a significant share of total 
production costs in advanced industries. There 
is little excuse not to lead in emerging industries 
and to maintain a strong competitive position.
Bold steps are needed to ensure that these 
challenges are met quickly and aggressively. 
Market forces alone will not achieve the needed 
change. In fact, market failures have made the 
problems worse over time. With sustained, 
strategic investments, the United States 
can regain fundamental manufacturing 
capabilities, ensure a return on federal 
investments in R&D, capitalize on technology 
changes broadly affecting manufacturing, 
establish leadership in new industries, and 
restore the broad-based supplier networks 
that are essential to economic and national 
security.
8LOSING THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMONS
The Industrial Commons is the set of 
knowledge and practical skills, supply chains 
and production capacity, materials and 
equipment, and overall industrial ecosystems 
that enable manufacturing across multiple 
industries. The term was coined by Pisano and 
Shih in 2009 and further elaborated in 2012.4 
Even before then, many studies, some dating 
back to the 1980s, have lamented the loss of 
U.S. manufacturing competitiveness. Despite 
remarkable advances in technology and a few 
government programs intended to strengthen 
domestic manufacturing, the situation has grown 
progressively worse over decades. Restoring 
the Industrial Commons is essential to restoring 
U.S. manufacturing competitiveness, but the 
more time passes, the more complex and 
expensive solutions have become. 
Current State of U.S. 
Manufacturing
A few indicators of the current state of U.S. 
manufacturing are instructive. First consider 
the U.S. trade balance in advanced industries. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, in 2016 the United 
States had a positive trade balance in only two 
advanced industries: aerospace and (barely) 
engines and turbines.5 Even in industries such 
as medical devices and pharmaceuticals, in 
which the federal government invests significant 
R&D and is the single largest customer, 
the nation does not maintain a positive 
trade balance. Furthermore, most domestic 
manufacturing industries use substantially more 
imported content than they did 20 years ago, 
as illustrated in Figure 2.6 Imported content 
4 Ibid.
5 IBISWorld. (2017). [Relevant industry reports]. Retrieved from IBISWorld database.
6 McKinsey Global Institute. (2017). Making it in America: Revitalizing US manufacturing. McKinsey & Company. Retrieved 
from https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/americas/making-it-in-america-revitalizing-us-manufacturing
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in technology-driven innovative products has 
grown from 45 to 58 percent in the past 15 
years with no sign that the trend will change. 
One direct result from the growth of imports is 
that real value added in U.S. manufacturing is 
hardly higher now than in the mid-1990s (Figure 
3); excluding computers and pharmaceuticals, 
it is barely 40 percent higher than in 1980, 
over 35 years in which U.S. gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew more than 2.5 times.7 The 
United States has already fallen behind Japan, 
South Korea, Germany, and other European 
nations in manufacturing value added as a 
percentage of GDP and in the value added 
contributed by high-technology industries to 
total manufacturing value added.8
 
These statistics lend credence to what has 
become accepted wisdom—the United 
7 Ibid.
8 Biting the bullet: China sets its sights on dominating sunrise industries. (2017). The Economist. Retrieved from https://
www-economist-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/news/finance-and-economics/21729442-its-record-industrial-policy-successes-
patchy-china-sets-its-sights
States is a post-industrial economy, fully 
globalized and integrated into the international 
production system. For many, manufacturing 
has simply followed the same path as 
agriculture, becoming a smaller proportion 
of GDP and providing fewer jobs, while 
national specialization moves to higher value 
activities. But manufacturing, especially but 
not exclusively, high-technology product 
manufacturing, is essential to national security. 
Manufacturing at scale is intricately linked to 
the ability to innovate next-generation products, 
yet domestic manufacturing is not the national 
priority it should be.
On one hand, it has become common wisdom 
that “manufacturing is done in China.” Kai-Fu 
Lee, a former senior Google executive, who 
now runs a venture capital fund and accelerator 
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in Beijing, put it this way: “Innovation moves 
faster here.”9 On the other, it is increasingly 
clear that globalization, mostly driven by U.S. 
manufacturers moving production to low-
wage countries in Asia, has had significant 
detrimental effects on the U.S economy. The 
loss of Industrial Commons means that not 
only are an increasing number of advanced 
technologies manufactured abroad but also 
that the United States cannot manufacture 
many of them. Skills have been lost, supply 
chains nearly eliminated.
Moving Production Offshore
Much of the initial offshoring stampede was 
led by consumer electronics in the 1960s after 
the invention of transistors, widespread use 
of standard shipping containers, and low-
cost assembly workers in Asia lowered the 
cost and expanded the market for consumer 
radios and televisions. Offshoring accelerated 
significantly after China joined the World Trade 
Organization in 2001 and as the capabilities 
of Asian producers increased, leading to U.S. 
firms contracting design and, ultimately, product 
development. By abdicating production, U.S. 
firms lost the ability to innovate and, in many 
cases became nothing more than brand 
names—think Sylvania, Magnavox. By the new 
millennia, virtually all consumer electronics were 
designed and made in Asia, along with personal 
computers and laptops. As would be expected, 
production of almost all the components shifted 
to Asia, too, despite serious concern by both 
industry and government in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s over the urgency of maintaining 
domestic production in areas such as dynamic 
random access memory (DRAM). 
9 The next wave: China’s audacious and inventive new generation of entrepreneurs. (2017). The Economist. Retrieved 
from https://www-economist-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/briefing/2017/09/23/chinas-audacious-and-inventive-new-
generation-of-entrepreneurs
10 Domestic Policy Council. (2006). American competitiveness initiative: Leading the world in innovation. Office of Science 
and Technology Policy. Retrieved from https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED503266.pdf
By the time new consumer electronic devices 
emerged, such as the iPod and later smart 
phones, domestic manufacturing was 
impossible because all the components were 
manufactured in Asia, despite the research to 
create these components in the first place all 
done here (see Figure 4). Research funded 
by the Department of Defense (DoD), the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of 
Energy (DoE), and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) contributed 
to the breakthrough technologies of magnetic 
storage drives, lithium-ion batteries, and the 
liquid crystal display, which came together 
in the development of MP3 devices and later 
in iPods and iPhones. The device itself is 
innovative, but it built upon a broad platform 
of component technologies, each derived 
from fundamental studies in physical science, 
mathematics, and engineering.10 
The ramifications of this lost production base 
have become profound. For instance, the 
leading disruptive force in the global economy 
has been mobile communications. The United 
States invented cellular communication 
technology and in the early years, companies 
like Motorola manufactured phones in this 
country. Although Apple led the shift to 
smart phones beginning in 2007, no iPhones 
were ever manufactured here. By then, all 
the inputs to the iPhone—display, memory, 
communication chips, etc.—were manufactured 
in Asia. Even sophisticated application-specific 
integrated circuits (ASICs) were made in 
Asian, primarily Taiwanese, semiconductor 
foundries. Successive generations of iPhones 
have followed the same pattern, in many 
cases with Apple providing assistance to their 
Asian suppliers to ensure access to sufficient 
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production equipment and continue to raise 
their manufacturing capabilities. The results 
have been stellar for Apple profits, share 
price, and iPhone consumers, but the United 
States has no foothold in actually making the 
single most important product segment of the 
current era.11 Even Android smartphones, some 
designed by Google and other American firms, 
are not, and cannot, be made in the United 
States. 
11 Half of all iPhones are assembled by Foxconn in Zhengzhou, China at a factory that employs 350,000 during peak 
production. Barboza, D. (2016, December 29). How China built ‘iPhone city’ with billions in perks for Apple’s partner. The 
New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/technology/apple-iphone-china-foxconn.html
12 There are currently two U.S.-based producers of OLED micro displays, Kopin in Westborough, Massachusetts and 
eMagin in Bellevue, Washington.
Flat panel displays are another broad category 
of electronics that cannot be manufactured 
in this country despite their ubiquity. Again, 
the technologies that enable most flat panel 
displays were invented by U.S. companies and 
universities. Few, if any, factories for LCD and 
LED large diameter flat panel displays were 
ever opened in the United States.12 Without that 
production experience, U.S. companies have 
been unable to commercialize the 
FIGURE 4: Example of Domestic Research Results Moving Offshore
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next generation of flexible displays, despite 
significant R&D investments by the U.S. 
military.13 
At least part of the explanation for the shift 
of semiconductor and electronic production 
to Asia is found in the early days of the 
semiconductor industry. At the outset, 
American companies such as Intel, AMD, Texas 
Instruments, and Motorola controlled the entire 
value chain, from design through manufacturing 
and packaging of semiconductors. Initially, 
packaging was a labor-intensive process. 
Microchips are packaged in plastic or ceramics 
with pins that fit into circuit boards. Wiring from 
the chip to the pins was a manual process, with 
workers using microscopes to attach the wire 
leads. Low-cost labor in Asia, initially Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Malaysia, was essential to limit 
overall production costs. Once packaging 
moved to Asia, the expertise in packaging 
technology moved near the factories, and the 
growth of Asian foundries made sense to be 
near the packaging experts. And once the 
total semiconductor value chain was mostly in 
Asia—Intel, GLOBALFOUNDRIES, Samsung, 
Micron Technologies, and NXP are among 
the exceptions with semiconductor fabrication 
facilities (fabs) in the United States—it made 
sense for major users of semiconductors such 
as consumer electronics and computers to 
locate factories in Asia, too. 
The United States is no longer where companies 
build new fabs. In 2011, of 27 high-volume fabs 
built worldwide, only one was in this country; 
18 were in China and 4 in Taiwan. In 2018, 
20 new fab projects had been announced 
in China, with total investment exceeding 
$10 billion.14 Meanwhile, the total number 
13 The Flexible Electronics and Display Center established by the U.S. Army at Arizona State University in 2004 includes 
multiple foreign partners such as Sharp, Auo, and LG.
14 Tseng, C., & Tracy, D. (2017). Fab investment surge in China. SEMI. Retrieved from http://www.semi.org/en/fab-
investment-surge-china-0
15 McKeefry, H. L. (2018, April 20). Component shortages define first half of 2018…& beyond. EBN. Retrieved from 
https://www.ebnonline.com/author.asp?section_id=3219&doc_id=283376
of fabs in the United States was projected 
to decline from 123 in 2007 to 95 by 2017. 
Predictably, as the industry has moved, the 
supply chain has gone with it. U.S. companies 
continue to have a majority of global market 
sales of semiconductors according to the 
Semiconductor Industry Association, but that 
share includes fabless companies, such as 
Nvidia and Qualcomm, that have designs 
manufactured in Asia by semiconductor 
foundries such as TSMC in Taiwan, the market 
leader. 
The American justification for relying on Asian 
electronics manufacturers is that these are 
high-cost, low-margin links in the value chain; 
U.S. firms capture the bulk of profits. While true 
at the moment, at least for some companies, 
this same logic began the offshoring of 
consumer electronics that led to the loss of 
the entire industry. If U.S. companies are 
dependent on foreign producers, ultimately 
their ability to innovate and meet rapid product 
cycles is likely to be infringed. In fact, in 
2018, shortages of electronic components—
multilayered ceramic chip capacitors, resistors, 
semiconductors, graphics cards—are 
growing as new markets and applications 
create surges in demand that mostly Asian 
manufacturers are unable to meet.15 As data 
capture and processing becomes pervasive 
in both products and processes, the United 
States will face ever-increasing dependence 
on foreign manufacturers across even more 
economic sectors. Figure 5 illustrates how 
this process of shifting production of new 
technologies offshore not only continues but 
has accelerated. By not manufacturing high-
technology products the nation loses the ability 
to innovate next-generation products, loses the 
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opportunity to create manufacturing jobs and 
national wealth, and increases dependence on 
foreign sources for national security.  
Potential Impacts on 
Emerging Industries
An obvious source of concern is automobiles. 
Electronics are projected to comprise half the 
value of automobiles in 2030, as the sensors 
and processors needed for autonomous 
16 Statista. (2013). Automotive electronics cost as a percentage of total car cost worldwide from 1950 to 2030. Statista. 
Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/277931/automotive-electronics-cost-as-a-share-of-total-car-cost-
worldwide/
17 Buckland, K., & Sano, N. (2018, February 5). Toyota’s way changed the world’s factories. now the retool. Automotive 
News Canada. Retrieved from http://canada.autonews.com/article/20180205/CANADA01/302059902/toyotas-way-
changed-the-worlds-factories.-now-the-retool
vehicles (AVs) multiply (Figure 6).16 Software 
development and R&D for AVs has clearly been 
a priority for automakers. Toyota, for example, 
has recently opened a research center in 
Silicon Valley and started software companies 
in Japan and the United States.17 Ford has a 
Smart Mobility unit that has acquired start-ups 
in software and cloud computing, and has 
started a new “Ford X” incubator. Ford is also 
increasing spending on electric vehicles, with 
plans to launch 40 new battery and hybrid 
models by 2022. Several automakers have 
contracted with Nvidia (fabless), historically 
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a leader in graphics processing units, for the 
processors needed for vehicle autonomy. 
Based on existing production capacity, the 
bulk of these electronic devices may be 
designed and engineered in this country, but 
most will be made in Asia. An exception is 
lidar supplier Velodyne, which opened a new 
factory in California in 2017 to manufacture its 
flagship lidar sensors.18 Velodyne entered the 
lidar business in 2005 after participating in an 
autonomous vehicle competition by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 
Its sensors are used in U.S. military vehicles.19 
The emergence of AVs and the shift to electric 
drivetrains will have additional impacts on U.S. 
manufacturing where the transportation sector 
comprises 15-20 percent of manufacturing 
employment. For instance, under the current 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
62.5 percent of the net cost of a vehicle must 
originate in North America. Current U.S. 
proposals call for 75 percent of electric or AV 
18 Krok, A. (2018, January 2). Velodyne just made self-driving cars a bit less expensive. Roadshow. Retrieved from 
https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/velodyne-just-made-self-driving-cars-a-bit-less-expensive-hopefully/
19 Mozur, P., & Perlez, J. (2017, April 7). China tech investment flying under the radar, Pentagon warns. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/business/china-defense-start-ups-pentagon-technology.html
20 Carey, N. (2018, May 14). NAFTA math many not add up to more U.S. auto jobs. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-autos/nafta-math-may-not-add-up-to-more-u-s-auto-jobs-idUSKCN1IF0CP
21 Frost, L., & Taylor, E. (2017, September 11). Carmakers face electric reality as combustion engine outlook dims. 
Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autoshow-frankfurt-electrics/carmakers-face-electric-reality-as-
combustion-engine-outlook-dims-idUSKCN1BN00X
value be manufactured in North America within 
nine years. Experts are skeptical that nine years 
will be sufficient to build sufficient electronics 
production capacity to meet that mandate.20
A shift to electric vehicles may further 
complicate domestic content objectives. 
According to some estimates, electric 
drivetrains, including batteries, require 
40 percent less manufacturing labor than 
mechanical drivetrains that require internal 
combustion engines, transmissions, exhausts, 
and cooling systems.21 Different skills will be 
needed, while at the same time, production is 
likely to be consolidated into fewer factories. 
Without growth in domestic production of 
batteries, motors, magnets, electrical harnesses, 
and other electric vehicle components, imports 
will magnify the adverse impact on the domestic 
industry. 
Production of all of these components and 
systems has grown rapidly in China because 
of the demand created by the government 
mandate to have 20 percent of vehicles sold 
by 2025 to use alternative fuel. Historically, the 
United States has used defense procurement 
to accelerate industrial development. Examples 
include aircraft, computers, semiconductors, 
robotics, and information networks. Leveraging 
defense procurement in emerging industries 
would promote early adoption, support pilot 
production, and help to re-establish the 
Industrial Commons needed for subsequent 
commercial-scale manufacturing.
None of these issues in semiconductors and 
electronics are new, having reached the highest 
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levels of government in the past. For instance, 
in 2005 the Defense Science Board (DSB) 
Task Force on High Performance Microchip 
Supply22 outlined the potential consequences 
of “a profound restructuring” of the electronics 
industry caused by offshore outsourcing, the 
rise of increasingly competitive government-
subsidized foreign producers, and substantial 
declines in federal support for basic R&D. The 
Department  of Defense (D0D) did not adopt 
DSB’s recommendations. In 2012, the Senate 
Armed Services Committee released the results 
of its investigation into electronic parts intended 
for weapons systems. It found 1,800 cases 
of suspected counterfeit parts involving 
more than 1 million parts for use in the most 
important military systems; 84,000 suspect 
counterfeit electronic parts were supplied by 
one Chinese company.23 Additional concern 
was addressed by the General Accountability 
Office (GAO) in 2015 in their review of trusted 
defense microelectronics. GAO found that 
access to leading-edge microelectronics faced 
challenges due to supply chain globalization, 
production costs, and market trends, and 
that future access and capabilities are 
uncertain.24 Finally, a January 2017 report by the 
President’s Council of Advisers on Science and 
Technology25 emphasized the importance of a 
robust domestic semiconductor industry for both 
national security and overall national innovation. 
It also identified the threat posed by aggressive 
Chinese industrial policies in this industry and 
the need, therefore, for the U.S. industry to 
maintain its lead through R&D and continued 
innovation. Oddly, although the report noted 
that the share of global fabrication capacity 
22 Defense Science Board. (2005). High performance microchip supply. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Retrieved from https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2000s/ADA435563.pdf
23 Senate Armed Services Committee. (2012). Senate Armed Services Committee Releases Report on Counterfeit 
Electronic Parts. Retrieved from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/senate-armed-services-
committee-releases-report-on-counterfeit-electronic-parts
24 U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2015). Trusted Defense Microelectronics: Future Access and Capabilities Are 
Uncertain. Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-185T 
25 President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. (2017). Ensuring Long-Term U.S. Leadership in 
Semiconductors. Executive Office of the President. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_ensuring_long-term_us_leadership_in_semiconductors.pdf
in the United States fell to about 13 percent 
in 2015, compared to 30 percent in 1990, it 
did not recommend any steps to encourage 
locating new fabs here. Even the best design 
and engineering of microchips is at risk without 
assured access to manufacturing. A few more 
reports are not going to turn the tide.
U.S. manufacturing issues created by the 
loss of Industrial Commons are not limited to 
electronics. Foundational manufacturing 
capabilities have been significantly reduced 
or lost entirely as production in multiple 
industries has moved abroad. Another 
prime example is machine tools and other 
production equipment. The United States once 
had a large, diverse machine tool industry with 
thriving clusters in Cincinnati and elsewhere. 
Foreign competition intensified in the 1980s as 
producers from Germany, Japan, and S. Korea 
built U.S. market share. In 1982 imports were 
only 26 percent of domestic consumption, but 
reached 64 percent in 2002 and 63 percent in 
2012 (Figure 7). Currently, only one U.S.-owned 
FIGURE 7: Import Penetration in the U.S. 
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machine tool company, Haas, is among the 
top 15 in revenue. A combination of foreign 
companies building U.S. factories and changes 
in technology have reduced the import share 
to roughly 50 percent in recent years, but the 
manufacturing knowledge base embodied in the 
industry has yet to recover.26
 
Another foundational manufacturing capability is 
tool and die making. In 2012, the Congressional 
Research Service stated that the U.S. tool and 
die industry is in a precarious state, largely due 
to offshoring. As major manufacturing industries 
have shifted production offshore, the tool and 
die industry endured a disproportionate loss of 
jobs and companies. Between 1998 and 2012 
over a third of U.S. tool, die, and mold makers 
closed and employment halved. Even then, 
the average age of a skilled toolmaker was 52, 
presaging a skill shortage being felt today.27 
Metal additive manufacturing could have a 
significant impact in reversing the negative 
trends in the tool and die industry, a critical 
foundational capability that calls for a national 
strategy and significant investment.
Even industries in which the United States 
has had a global leadership position, such as 
medical devices and pharmaceuticals, are now 
dependent on Asian producers for many of their 
products. In pharmaceuticals, more than 80 
percent of the active ingredients are imported, 
mostly from China and India. Generic drugs 
comprise more than 85 percent of the U.S. 
market, but only 10 percent are 
26 Unpublished data from The Association for Manufacturing Technology, based on census data.
27 Canis, B. (2012). The tool and die industry: Contribution to U.S. manufacturing and federal policy considerations. 
Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from http://www.ntma.org/uploads/general/Tool-and-Die-Industry.pdf
28 Koons, C. (2018, April 11). Why we may lose generic drugs. Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-04-11/are-drug-prices-too-low
29 According to federal data, only 5 percent of the more than 230 million surgical masks and 30 percent of the more than 
20 million respirators bought by American health care each year are made in the United States. McKenna, M. (2018). 
Medicine’s long, thin supply chain. Wired. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/story/medicines-long-thin-supply-chain/ 
30 Kaplan, S., & Thomas, K. (2018, April 6). Why Trump’s tariffs could raise the cost of a hip replacement. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/health/trump-tariffs-china-devices-drugs.html
manufactured domestically.28 Other medical 
supplies, including basics such as intravenous 
solutions, syringes, surgical masks, and 
respirators are imported and frequently in short 
supply.29 In medical devices, China provides 
about 12 percent of total U.S imports, including 
orthopedics, defibrillators, pacemakers, and 
magnetic resonance imaging scanners.30 
 
Despite multiple reports raising alarms for 
years, there is little evidence of improvement. 
The simple reason is profit maximization 
by the private sector and a lack of a 
comprehensive, long-term national strategy 
by the public sector. To a great extent, this 
lost Industrial Commons is a consequence of 
U.S. corporate strategy to maximize profits by 
inventing here and making there. Economic 
conditions and financial incentives made 
this an effective strategy, and the positive 
financial results have outweighed any doubts 
or concerns for long-term national security or 
economic health. U.S. government policy, reliant 
on the free market principles of comparative 
advantage, has largely been supportive of 
offshoring production, turning a blind eye to the 
negative impacts on defense production and 
the long-term detrimental effects on the nation’s 
Industrial Commons. Now, the consequences 
of moving production capacity and know-how 
offshore has forced a new strategy among 
many U.S. manufacturers and an accepted 
norm among public officials: invent there, 
manufacture there. The negative and dangerous 
ramifications of this trend cannot be overstated.
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Short Time Horizons and Shareholder Value*
Despite warnings about loss of manufacturing competitiveness going back to the 1980s, U.S. 
manufacturing has continued to shrink as a share of GDP, has had worsening trade balance in 
advanced technologies, and has become more dependent on foreign sources for critical inputs. The 
overwhelming conclusion is that market forces, specifically financial market forces, drive the managers 
of U.S. manufacturers to make decisions that have proven to be harmful to national interests. These 
same forces are not evident in other advanced nations, such as Germany and Japan, that have 
maintained strong manufacturing sectors.
Public corporations in the United States are frequently criticized for focusing on quarterly profits and 
changes to their stock price. This focus is partially driven by rapid turnover in stock ownership: the 
average time investors hold a stock fell from eight years in the 1960s to only four months by 
2012. Further, senior management compensation typically combines salary and stock options, helping 
to drive decisions that will benefit shareholders. Ostensibly intended to maximize the value of the 
business for the owners of the business, using stock price as a proxy for business value drives short-
term decisions. For manufacturers, over-emphasis on minimizing production costs results in offshoring 
of production and constant pressure on suppliers to lower costs; treating research as an expense to 
be avoided rather than a long-term investment reduces R&D spending; and using retained earnings 
(and tax windfalls) for stock buybacks rather than productive investments compromises long-term 
competitiveness.
This focus on shareholder value, now considered a cornerstone of American capitalism, is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, driven by policy changes in the 1980s. First, prior to 1982 antitrust standards 
restricted mergers, but antitrust guidelines were relaxed so that a large market share of a combined 
entity would not guarantee that a merger would be blocked. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
in 1982 that state laws against hostile takeovers were unconstitutional because they limited interstate 
commerce. This change led to a rapid increase in hostile takeovers, from one in 1980 to more than 
100 between 1984 and 1988. Third, tax reform in 1981 encouraged defined contribution retirement 
plans—termed 401k plans after the section in the legislation—which greatly increased the number of 
people owning stock, mostly through mutual funds. In 1982, mutual funds had $135 billion in assets; 
by 2017, assets totaled nearly $19 trillion. Mutual funds are now the largest owners of corporate stock, 
sometimes holding more than 10 percent of individual companies. 
These changes caused and, over time, reinforced shareholder value as the primary touchstone for 
managers of public corporations. Yet, according to Gallup, only 52 percent of Americans own stock. 
Foreign firms and U.S. private firms do not face the same pressure to maximize stock prices, 
and by many accounts, are more willing to make long-term investments and to consider the 
interests of all stakeholders when making management decisions. The prevalence of so-called 
stakeholder capitalism in Germany, for example, is a significant reason that the German manufacturing 
sector remains more than 20 percent of its GDP.
* More detail can be found in The Vanishing Corporation by Gerald Davis (2016) and The Shareholder Value 
Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations and the Public by Lynn Stout (2012).
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INVENT THERE, 
MANUFACTURE THERE
31 GM China science lab key to future global developments. (2017, May 23). The Newswheel. Retrieved from http://
thenewswheel.com/gm-china-science-lab-key-to-future-global-developments/
“Large-scale innovation has become an engine for China’s economic development.”
Matt Tsie, GM Executive Vice President and GM China President, May 201731
The weak state of the U.S. Industrial Commons 
has had detrimental impacts on the entire 
national innovation ecosystem. As more 
production of advanced technologies has 
moved abroad, more research and product 
development has moved with it due to the close 
ties between product and process technologies. 
Studies have shown that manufacturers 
are twice as productive at R&D when that 
work is collocated with a factory. Yet, U.S. 
manufacturers continue to outsource. Since 
2000, more than 70,000 manufacturing plants 
have closed or moved offshore, threatening the 
nation’s innovation ecosystem. The ramifications 
can be seen not only in shifts in R&D spending 
by manufacturers, but also in the ability of U.S. 
innovators to make new products. Because the 
nation is dependent on its ability to innovate, 
cracks in the system bode ill for long-term 
national prosperity as high-technology 
manufacturing is increasingly offshored.
R&D Spending by 
Manufacturers
Recent years have witnessed a noticeable 
shift in R&D spending by U.S. manufacturers. 
Historically, manufacturing companies have 
been the largest corporate R&D spenders, 
driven by the need for new products, 
incorporating new technologies into existing 
products, and devising new, more efficient 
processes to make products. The share of R&D 
spending by manufacturers has been falling in
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FIGURE 8: U.S. R & D Spending in Advanced Manufacturing Industries 
(Millions Constant 2010 $)
the United States. In 1990 manufacturers spent 
more than 83 percent of total private sector 
R&D spending in the country; this fell to less 
than 60 percent in 2002 before recovering to 66 
percent in 2015.32 Most of the growth in recent 
years is attributable to the pharmaceutical 
industry, with other advanced manufacturing 
industries either declining or stagnating (Figure 
8). Perhaps more worrying, the focus of R&D 
spending, at least among publicly traded 
manufacturers, has steadily shifted toward 
development, especially incremental product 
development. A 2007 study found that just 6 
percent of companies published research in 
scientific journals, down nearly two-thirds since 
1980. Largely due to pressure from investors, 
corporations spend less on basic science and 
32 ANBERD: business enterprise R&D broken down by industry. (2017). OECD.Stat. Retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/
Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANBERD_REV4
33 Matthews, C. (2015, December 21). The death of American research and development. Fortune. Retrieved from http://
fortune.com/2015/12/21/death-american-research-and-development/
34 Dewey & LeBoeuf. (2009). Maintaining America’s competitive edge: Government policies affecting semiconductor 
industry R&D and manufacturing activity. Semiconductor Industry Association. Retrieved from https://www.
semiconductors.org/document_library_and_resources/tax/maintaining_america_s_competitive_edge_government_
policies_affecting_semiconductor_industry_r_d_and_manufacturing_ activities/
have closed broad-based corporate research 
labs.33
A number of factors have changed this dynamic 
in the United States. First, as more production 
moves offshore, the locus of both product and 
process development moves with it. There are 
a few exceptions, such as Apple, that maintain 
control of product design and the processes 
used by suppliers to make those designs, 
but in many cases, the expertise gained by 
producing builds the expertise needed for 
new product design and development. A 
2009 survey of U.S. semiconductor producers 
concluded that process R&D requires proximity 
to manufacturing operations.34 In the aerospace 
industry, the trend toward increased outsourcing 
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of parts and systems is seen as diminishing 
the long-term prospects for U.S. business jet 
manufacturers. Industry representatives 
recognize that many of the best ideas for 
manufacturing innovation come from the 
factory floor.35 Experience demonstrates 
in multiple industries that proximity to 
manufacturing fuels innovations in both 
products and processes.
A recent survey of 369 manufacturers reveals 
the main benefits of moving R&D to China 
(Figure 9).36 Most of the top reasons are directly 
related to the strength of China’s Industrial 
Commons.35 U.S. companies have been most 
aggressive in moving R&D to China in the 
last decade. Figure 10 illustrates both the 
growth in foreign companies’ R&D spending in 
China and the predominance of U.S. companies 
compared to other major countries.35 Over 40 
percent of all foreign R&D investments in China 
are by U.S. corporations.
It is important to note that China has an explicit 
policy to attract foreign R&D centers with  
35 U.S. International Trade Commission. (2012). Business jet aircraft industry: Structure and factors affecting 
competitiveness. Retrieved from https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4314.pdf
36 Consultancy.UK. (2015, November 17). R&D and innovation spend increasingly moving to China. Consultancy.UK. 
Retrieved from https://www.consultancy.uk/news/2944/rd-and-innovation-spend-increasingly-moving-to-china
 
FIGURE 9: Factors driving manufacturing R&D to China
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FIGURE 11: Advanced Technology Imports from China ($ Billions)
economic incentives and to recruit both 
expatriate Chinese and foreign scientists. The 
Thousand Talents program was launched in 
China in 2008 to attract academics to return to 
China. Using appeals to patriotism, financial
incentives, and better career prospects, China 
has successfully attracted expatriate scientists 
with experience in defense research. So many 
scientists have been recruited back to China 
from Los Alamos National Laboratory that they 
have a moniker, “the Los Alamos club.”37
A second factor reducing R&D investment by 
U.S. manufacturers is the growth of Chinese 
imports in advanced technology industries 
(Figure 11). Research in 2015 found that 
increases in import competition from China 
tend to reduce R&D and other forward-looking 
investments.38
37 Chen, S. (2017, March 29). America’s hidden role in Chinese weapons research. South China Morning Post. Retrieved 
from http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2082738/americas-hidden-role-chinese-weapons-
research
38 Arora, A., Belenzon, S., and Patacconi, A. (2015). Killing the Golden Goose? The Decline of Science in Corporate R&D. 
NBER Working Paper 20902. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w20902
39 Knott, A.M. (2017). The real reasons companies are so focused on the short term. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved 
from https://hbr.org/2017/12/the-real-reasons-companies-are-so-focused-on-the-short-term
Third, management decisions to decentralize 
R&D, moving it to individual business 
units for the perceived advantage of being 
closer to the customer, often have the 
perverse effect of losing long-term strategic 
perspective. Instead of providing long-term 
competitive advantage, R&D becomes just 
another cost center to be minimized.39 
Finally, the availability of foreign research and 
engineering talent has grown substantially in 
recent years. For some companies, moving 
R&D offshore is the high-skilled equivalent 
of moving production offshore for low-
cost factory labor. Controlling R&D costs is 
especially critical at a time when R&D 
productivity has fallen sharply. Between the 
1960s and 2000s, research productivity fell 
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by a factor of eight.40 As more researchers are 
required for a given objective, and the number 
and quality of foreign researchers increases, 
cost-conscious American firms are likely to 
continue to raise research spending abroad.
Recent data, as well as corporate 
announcements, illustrate changes in 
manufacturing R&D. The largest R&D spenders 
among manufacturers in 2017 were in the 
computer/electronics, pharmaceutical, and 
automotive sectors. Intel, which spent nearly 
$13 billion on R&D, was the only computer/
electronics firms on the list that actually 
manufactures in the United States. Others, such 
as Apple and Cisco, spending $10 billion and 
$6.3 billion respectively on R&D, use Asian 
contract manufacturers and have no domestic 
production.41 All have significant research 
centers abroad.
A few examples of major U.S. firms conducting 
R&D offshore include: 
 ■ Applied Materials, the world’s largest 
supplier of semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment, built its largest research 
laboratory in Xi’an, China because 
researchers need to be close to the 
factories using the equipment. Government 
incentives to choose this location included 
a 75-year, discounted lease and 25  
 
40 The trend crosses multiple industries. For example, the number of researchers needed to double chip density in 
accordance with Moore’s law is 18 times the number needed in the 1970s. Bloom, N.A., Jones, C.I., Van Reenen, J., and 
Webb, M. (2017). Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find? Stanford Business School Working Paper No. 3592. Retrieved from 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/are-ideas-getting-harder-find
41 Bloomberg; Capital IQ. (2017). Ranking of the 20 companies with the highest spending on research and development 
in 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars). Statista. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/265645/ranking-of-the-20-
companies-with-the-highest-spending-on-research-and-development/
42 Bradsher, K. (2010, March 17). China drawing high-tech research from U.S. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/18/business/global/18research.html 
43 Stanway, D. (2018, March 20). China electric car execs call for policy support, end to protectionism. Reuters. Retrieved 
from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-autos-electric/china-electric-car-execs-call-for-policy-support-end-to-
protectionism-idUSKBN1GW0O0
44 Swanson, A., and Bradsher, K. (2010, April 30). China drawing H-T research from U.S. The New York Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/us/politics/trump-china-researchers-espionage.html
45 Gartenberg, C. (2017, March 17). Apple is opening two more R&D centers in China. The Verge. Retrieved from https://
www.theverge.com/2017/3/17/14960534/apple-research-centers-china-shanghai-suzhou
percent of operating costs paid for five 
years.42
 ■ General Motors opened a large research 
center in Shanghai which serves as its 
center of global electric vehicle research 
because China is the world’s largest 
market for electric vehicles. In 2017, China 
manufactured nearly 800,000 electric 
vehicles.43
 ■ Intel has a large research center in 
Beijing for semiconductors and server 
networks because China is the biggest 
market for desktop computers and has the 
most internet users.44
 ■ Apple announced two new R&D 
centers, in Shanghai and Suzhou, in 2017, 
joining centers in Beijing and Shenzhen. 
Apple committed to spend over $500 
million on research in China focused on 
working with local partners to develop 
new technologies. China is Apple’s largest 
overseas market and home to almost all of 
its product manufacturing.45 
Relative decline in R&D by U.S. manufacturers, 
along with a greater emphasis on development, 
means that incremental innovation is the primary 
focus to make current products better, lighter, 
faster, and cheaper—all of which are essential 
to remain globally competitive. The federal 
government, on the other hand, invests 
mostly in long-term basic research. American
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corporations rarely leverage the results of 
federal research to transition nascent but 
promising technologies into successful 
commercial products. In some cases, 
federal R&D funding supports technologies in 
which there is little if any domestic industrial 
production; advanced batteries are an example. 
Correcting this disconnect in the national 
innovation system is essential to long-
term competitiveness. For both defense and 
commercial innovations, federal funding of 
university-performed R&D is becoming more 
critical to the national innovation system. 
Yet weaknesses in this part of the national 
innovation system negatively impact the national 
wealth that should be captured from this large 
investment in R&D.
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BREAKDOWNS IN THE U.S. 
INNOVATION SYSTEM
The emerging shift in strategy by U.S. 
multinational manufacturers from “innovate here, 
manufacture there” to “innovate there, manufacture 
there” is creating challenges for the national 
innovation system that may not be fully recognized. 
Relative decline in domestic R&D spending by 
manufacturers puts more emphasis on government 
R&D to maintain the pace of innovation needed 
for future national competitiveness. Unfortunately, 
an innovation system that relies on government 
funding of university research is not well suited 
to maximizing commercialization of products. 
As central as university R&D is to the national 
innovation system, relatively little government-
funded university-performed R&D is converted to 
national wealth through the production and sale of 
new products and application of new processes 
and methods. Technology transfer from national 
research laboratories is also weak. The system 
is not even structured to ensure that R&D results 
create national competitive advantage. A national 
strategy to nurture and leverage promising ideas 
has never been implemented, relying instead on 
market forces. From a global perspective, most 
R&D results from American universities are readily 
available to be commercialized elsewhere, but 
when viewed from a national perspective, the fruits 
of R&D have not sufficiently driven improvements 
to national wealth and security.  Invention without 
production has been a consistent pattern for 
multiple mass market technologies in recent 
decades. For the sake of long-term growth and 
security, these shortcomings must be corrected at 
once.
Figure 12 illustrates the “cycle of innovation” 
typical for manufactured products. Basic research 
in science and engineering is one source of a 
myriad of discoveries and inventions, some of 
which are suitable for new product introductions, 
some for incremental improvements to existing 
products, and, of course, some that contribute 
to basic scientific understanding. Another 
equally important source of new inventions is 
the necessity to meet the challenges that arise 
from manufacturing at scale. New process 
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FIGURE 12: The Cycle of Innovation
technologies, quality and inspection methods, 
control technologies, and new products emerge 
from the manufacturing experience, depicted 
by the arrow from Manufacturing to Discoveries 
& Inventions. For those discoveries and 
inventions that could become new products and 
technologies, additional research—translational 
research—is necessary to demonstrate proof-
of-concept. Typically, a prototype is built 
that operates under constrained laboratory 
conditions with sufficient functionality to file 
for patent protection. If the proof-of-concept 
is promising, a more functional prototype is 
developed and the design is refined for factors 
such as manufacturability, safety, reliability, 
cost-effective recyclability,  and user interface. 
Then the production process is engineered, 
tested and refined in pilot production, and if 
successful, scaled to full manufacture of a new 
product or technology. Within a manufacturing 
company, new product sales produce the 
profits to fund the basic research that maintains 
the cycle. Within a research entity based in an 
academic institution or a federal laboratory, 
other steps are involved to move the invention 
into an existing company or a start-up firm 
created to commercialize it. How this cycle of 
innovation applies to university R&D is where 
the leakages become obvious, illustrating 
the shortcomings in the system, as well as 
opportunities to fix it.
Figure 13 illustrates the same cycle of 
innovation, but highlights serious leakages in 
the U.S. innovation pipeline as it becomes more 
reliant on university R&D. The basic cycle is 
the same; however, at multiple steps along the 
way, either knowledge is lost, stagnates in the 
laboratory, or  is commercialized abroad. 
First, opportunity for foreign competitors to 
take advantage of research outcomes is, at 
the moment, a fundamental part of the system. 
Academic research, especially in science and 
engineering (S&E), is dependent on foreign 
graduate students, predominantly from Asia. 
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FIGURE 13: Gaps in the Cycle of Innovation
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U.S. Federal funding is largely restricted to maturing Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) but not Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs)
Technology Readiness
In 1966, foreign students received 23 percent 
of S&E doctorates; in 2015, foreign students 
received 56 percent of engineering doctorates, 
53 percent in mathematics and computer 
science, and 44 percent in physics.46 These 
graduate students are the hands-on researchers 
in university laboratories and therefore are 
most intimately familiar with the work, have the 
knowledge needed to recreate the work, and 
are best prepared to help commercialize the 
results. 
Nationality would not matter if these graduates 
46 National Science Foundation. (2018). Science & Engineering Indicators 2018. Retrieved from https://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/2018/nsb20181/
47 The 2010 U.S. census found that 25 percent of the Bachelor’s degree holders in STEM occupations are foreign born, 
as were just under half of all PhD holders.
48 The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S.744 - 113th Congress, proposed 
eliminating numerical limits on immigrants who had earned a doctorate degree or a graduate degree in science, 
technology, engineering, or mathematics with an employment offer.
remained in this country. International students 
are eligible to work in the United States for a 
year after graduating, a period called Optional 
Practical Training. Graduates in science, 
engineering, technology, and mathematics 
(STEM) can work for an additional two years. 
After that, they are subject to the same visa 
lottery system as other immigrants. Historically, 
work visas have allowed many to stay.47 Many 
have argued that foreign S&E graduates should 
receive permanent resident status (green 
cards) along with their diplomas,48 a reasonable 
argument considering that immigrants have 
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accounted for roughly 25 percent of the recent 
innovation activity in the U.S. economy.49
The predominance of foreign students in S&E 
graduate programs, and the growing tendency 
to return to their home countries, is also tied 
to the loss of the Industrial Commons in the 
United States and the shift of manufacturing 
R&D abroad. According to the NSF, in 2015 the 
job market for S&E doctorate recipients was the 
lowest since 2000, 4-13 points below its most 
recent peak in 2006.50 With poor job prospects, 
U.S. students avoid graduate studies and 
foreign students return home even if they would 
prefer to stay.
However, foreign students are not the only 
source of leakage. In some cases, foreign 
institutions partner with American universities 
that are often encouraged to include foreign 
institutions in their research proposals. 
Engineering Research Centers (ERCs), funded 
by the NSF, have been an example, at least until 
recently. In other cases, foreign companies are 
members or participants in academic research 
centers. These firms may have significant 
presence, including manufacturing facilities, 
in the United States, and in some cases, 
may be essential participants for a center to 
access state of the art product and process 
technology. But they may also manufacture 
exclusively in their home countries, capturing 
the wealth generation and economic multiplier 
benefits at home. Nanotechnology, a national 
priority reflected in the creation of the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative in 2003, is a case in 
point.51 The Japanese firm, Canon, established 
a U.S. affiliate, Canon Nanotechnologies, to 
partner with the NSF ERC 
49 Kerr, W. (2007). The ethnic composition of U.S. inventors. Harvard Business School Working Paper 08-006. Retrieved 
from https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=20233
50 National Science Foundation. (2015). What are the postgraduation trends? Science and Engineering Doctorates. 
Retrieved from https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2017/nsf17306/report/what-are-the-postgraduation-trends/job-market-
science-and-engineering.cfm
51 U.S. Government Publishing Office. (2003). 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act. Retrieved 
from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ153/content-detail.html
for Nanomanufacturing Systems for Mobile 
Computing and Mobile Energy Technologies 
Display at the University of Texas. But Canon 
Nanotechnologies only conducts R&D; the 
nanotechnologies Canon licensed from the ERC 
are manufactured in Japan. Similar examples 
occur in other technologies such as displays, 
batteries, tissue engineering, and solar panels.
The process of funding academic research 
presents further opportunity for results to be 
captured by foreign companies. A typical faculty 
member receives funding from NSF and/or other 
federal agencies for an extended period of time 
to conduct basic research, often totaling several 
million dollars. Once a technology is proven to 
work even in a lab environment, the researcher 
will have difficulty maturing the technology 
further, for instance by testing prototypes in an 
operating environment, maturing manufacturing 
readiness or manufacturing at scale. After a 
few futile attempts to attract funding from the 
government or private sources, the researcher 
turns to (or is approached by) a foreign 
institute with money and facilities to establish 
a laboratory overseas. This happens quite 
regularly, with the loss of multiple promising 
technologies, all because the United States 
lacks strategy or a mechanism to fund nurturing 
and maturing of valuable results from the R&D 
that government funded in the first place. 
Within the innovation cycle of university R&D, 
commercialization is dependent on licensing. 
However, interest in licensing depends on the 
research results demonstrating commercial 
feasibility through a proof-of-concept prototype, 
which requires translational research. In many 
cases, funding for translational research
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is not readily available so many promising 
discoveries and inventions remain on the 
shelf or, at best, become side projects while 
the research team moves on to the next 
grant. This lack of translational research funding 
is another weakness in this innovation cycle.
Assuming the invention is sufficiently proven to 
attract licensing interest, negotiating a license 
is often overly complex, time-consuming, and 
expensive. Although some universities have 
relatively simple licenses with simple fees and 
royalties designed for start-ups, established 
companies perceive the licensing process to 
be difficult and therefore avoid it. Consequently, 
to a great extent, university inventions are 
licensed to start-ups specifically created to 
commercialize the technology. The start-up 
culture continues to grow, encouraged by 
hugely successful examples of companies 
emerging from universities.52 Between 1980 and 
2014, nearly 5,000 companies were launched 
from university research.53 By one estimate, 
30 percent of the value of companies listed 
on the NASDAQ stems from university-based, 
federally funded research, primarily due to the 
value of the intellectual property generated by 
the research.54 Yet, for manufacturing start-ups 
striving to commercialize hardware products, 
the challenges are significant, especially with a 
goal of building a manufacturing business in this 
country (see Investment Capital for Hardware 
Start-ups).
Even when hardware start-ups receive venture 
funding, it typically does not include the funds 
needed to scale production, the next step 
52 Google’s initial public offering in 2003 returned over $330 million to Stanford University.
53 Belz, A. (2016). Trends in industry-university research relationships. A Vision for the Future of Center-Based, 
Multidisciplinary Engineering Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Retrieved from https://www.nap.
edu/catalog/23645/a-vision-for-the-future-of-center-based-multidisciplinary-engineering-research
54 Ibid.
55 Reynolds, E.B., Samel, H.M., and Lawrence, J. (2014). Learning by building: Complementary assets and the migration 
of capabilities in U.S. innovative firms. In R.M. Locke & R.L. Wellhausen (Eds.), Production in the Innovation Economy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
56 Bonvillian, W.B., and Singer, P.L. (2018). Advanced Manufacturing: The New American Innovation Policies. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
in the innovation cycle and another source 
of weakness. MIT’s study, Production in the 
Innovation Economy, examined 150 production-
related hardware start-ups emerging from MIT 
research. The study found that these start-ups 
had access to sufficient skills and financing 
for R&D and initial product demonstration, 
but when the time came to scale production 
to commercial levels, the need for additional 
capital, production capabilities, and lead 
customers pushed many of these firms to move 
production abroad, usually to China.55 Other 
studies have documented a slowdown in the 
formation of new manufacturing start-ups and 
continuing stagnation in their ability to scale 
production.56 
China’s network of suppliers, skills, and 
customers is strong, responsive, and easy to 
work with. Numerous American consultancies 
facilitate this process at every stage; Dragon 
Innovation in Boston and PCH International in 
San Francisco are examples. In many cases, 
Chinese investors provide the needed capital to 
make the move offshore, or to buy the U.S. start-
up outright. Often, these purchases provide 
access to advanced technologies that provide 
competitive advantage to the buyers that is then 
lost in this country.
Part of what makes Chinese production 
attractive is the willingness of Chinese 
investors to accept the risk and producers 
to access whatever manufacturing 
processes are necessary to produce the new 
technology, even developing new processes 
if needed. Except in specialized cases, 
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for instance when a technology is defense 
related, neither universities nor hardware 
start-ups have sufficient funding to increase 
the manufacturability of new technologies, 
the Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL). 
Fabricating a few prototypes is not the same 
as manufacturing at scale. Basic fabrication 
can often be demonstrated in the laboratory, 
but determining the detailed design attributes 
and the engineering architecture needed 
to scale to volume manufacturing requires 
additional research. Raising the MRL from 
capability to produce in the laboratory (MRL 
4) to capability to produce in a production-
representative environment with most of 
the specifications clearly defined (MRL 7) 
would be a boon to start-ups and other 
licensees and increase domestic alternatives 
to Chinese production. It requires significant 
investment in creating pilot production facilities, 
which is typically too risky and expensive for 
venture capital investors; large multinational 
manufacturers tend to show interest only after 
higher TRLs and MRLs are achieved; and 
currently there is no federal S&T agency that 
funds the necessary translational research or 
invests in maturing MRLs.
Finally, the importance of the linkages between 
manufacturing and the research that leads 
to new discoveries and inventions must not 
be overlooked. The knowledge gained by 
manufacturing includes both knowledge about 
the production process and about the products 
being produced, both of which help to define 
questions to be tackled by research. This is the 
basis for the growing trend to locate research 
activities near the offshore factories reside, to 
be near the knowledge and the questions. By 
not manufacturing, the United States is losing 
ground in a range of industries—displays, 
57 Explore data at PWC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/technology/moneytree/explorer.html#/%20
type=history&category=&currentQ=Q1%202018&qRangeStart=Q1%202013&qRangeEnd=Q1%202018&chartType=bar 
58 Bonvillian and Singer describe why VCs are drawn to software and biotechnology in “Innovation Orchards”: Helping 
Tech Start-Ups Scale from ITIF (2017), available at https://itif.org/publications/2017/03/27/innovation-orchards-helping-
tech-start-ups-scale
energy storage, drones, solar cells, for 
example—that are important to national security 
and future commercial industries.
Investment Capital for 
Hardware Start-ups
The venture capital industry in the United States 
is the world’s largest and most robust, well-
recognized for its critical role in the national 
innovation system. As important as it is, venture 
capital is rarely invested in manufacturing 
and, in fact, is ill-suited for hardware start-ups 
that need long-term, patient capital to ensure 
success.
Since 2002, both the number of deals and the 
amount invested by venture capital funds in 
manufacturing have averaged just 0.4 percent. 
The dollars invested exceeded 1 percent of the 
total (barely) only twice, in 2008 and 2009.57 
Figure 14 illustrates the distribution of venture 
capital investment by market sector in 2017.
The reasons so little venture capital is 
invested in manufacturing start-ups are 
simple: cascading risks and time. Compared 
to the most common alternatives in software and 
biotechnology, manufacturing new, unproven 
products confronts risks at multiple points. 
Will the product work as intended? Can it be 
manufactured profitably? Are needed suppliers 
available at the right cost and delivery time? Will 
customers buy it in sufficient quantities to justify 
the needed capital investment? Obviously, 
many of these challenges face software and 
biotechnology start-ups, but the investments 
required to rapidly scale software are much 
lower than hardware.58 The operational costs 
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FIGURE 14: U.S. Venture Capital 
Investments by Sector, 2017 
Software 57.4%
Other 13.0%
Biotechnology 10.9%
Medical devices
 and equipment  7.9%
IT Services 5.4%
Industrial/
energy 1.5%
Media and 
entertainment 1.8%
Consumer products 
and services  2.1%
FIGURE 15: Foreign Participation in the 
U.S. Venture Capital Market, 2017
Russia 1% ($9 B) Other 3% ($17 B)
Japan 3% ($19 B)
China 5% ($30 B)
Europe 12% ($76 B)
U.S. 76% ($469 B)
to launch a software company declined by an 
estimated factor of 100 between 2000 and 2010. 
As a result, private capital markets skewed 
strongly toward software: software attracts 
capital at a rate of roughly 7:1 compared 
to industrial opportunities, compared with 
roughly 2:1 twenty years ago.59
Although venture capital has a history of funding 
favored industries in waves—the current wave 
favors artificial intelligence start-ups—a review 
of a few recent hardware start-ups helps to 
explain the relative lack of interest. According 
to CB Insights, the seven largest consumer 
hardware start-ups in recent years were 
Jawbone, NJoy, Juicero, Fuhu, Pebble, Zeebo, 
and hello. Between them, they raised nearly 
$1.5 billion. Four went bankrupt and three were 
purchased: Pebble sold to Fitbit; Fuhu, a tablet 
maker, sold to Mattel; and NJoy, an e-cigarette 
maker, was purchased by Homewood Capital.60 
At least in this consumer hardware industry 
segment, success has been far from assured.
59 Belz, A. (2016). Trends in industry-university research relationships. A Vision for the Future of Center-Based, 
Multidisciplinary Engineering Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Retrieved from https://www.nap.
edu/catalog/23645/a-vision-for-the-future-of-center-based-multidisciplinary-engineering-research
60 CB Insights. (2017). The Top 9 Reasons Hardware Startups Fail. Retrieved from https://www.cbinsights.com/research/
report/hardware-startups-failure-success/
61 Sprinkle, T. (2017) Strings Attached. Mechanical Engineering, 139(05), 32-37. http://doi.org/10.1115/1.2017-May-1
62 Mozur, P. and Perlez, J. (2017, March 22). China bets on sensitive U.S. start-ups, worrying the Pentagon. The New 
York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/technology/china-defense-start-ups.html
63 Ohlandt, C., Morris, L., et. al. (2017). Chinese Investment in U.S. Aviation. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
The U.S. venture capital market is also 
becoming more international, with foreign-based 
funds capturing a growing share of the market, 
reaching nearly 25 percent of the market. Figure 
15 illustrates this foreign participation in 2017. 
Foreign investment in and purchases of U.S. 
start-ups has raised concerns in some sectors.61 
For example, Chinese investment in Neurala, a 
Boston-based artificial intelligence start-up with 
technology to make robots more perceptive, 
raised alarms in government circles, but Neurala 
had been unsuccessful raising government 
or private U.S. capital. Investments in other 
firms developing technologies with potential 
military applications, such as rocket engines, 
sensors for autonomous vehicles, and flexible 
electronics have also raised concerns among 
U.S. military officials.62 The aerospace industry 
has been particularly attractive to Chinese 
investors with multiple deals made in recent 
years (Figure 16).63 At least partially to counter 
this weakness in the private venture capital 
market, state governments, universities, and 
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FIGURE 16: Chinese Investments in the U.S. Aerospace Industry
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non-profit organizations have established small 
angel and venture funds. Usually established as 
part of a state’s economic development efforts, 
these funds have a mixed record of success, 
usually due to investment decisions based 
on political expediency rather than rigorous 
technological and market assessment. However, 
many have navigated sometimes conflicting 
objectives to achieve long-term success. Some 
of the larger public venture funds include 
Connecticut Innovations, Elevate Ventures 
(Indianapolis), Innovation Works (Pittsburgh), 
TMCx Innovations (Houston), TEDCO 
(Maryland), and Rev1 Ventures (Columbus, 
Ohio). These funds typically restrict funding to 
start-ups established in the local state or region, 
often as university spin-offs. Among the larger 
funds, they are more likely than private venture 
capitalists to invest in hardware, production-
oriented start-ups, averaging roughly 20 percent 
of their portfolios.64 Some examples include:
 ■ The Oregon Nanoscience and 
Microtechnologies Institute leveraged 
Portland’s historical strength in the 
semiconductor industry to create a new 
state-wide cluster, including gap funding 
64 Internal analysis conducted on data gathered from PitchBook, https://pitchbook.com/
65 Matheson, R. (2016, October 26). MIT launches new venture for world-changing entrepreneurs. MIT News. Retrieved 
from https://news.mit.edu/mit-announces-the-engine-for-entrepreneurs-1026
66 Interview with Jill Sorensen, Director of Entrepreneurial Programs for SCRA.
(via two programs offering $75,000, then 
$250,000) to support nascent materials 
science ventures.
 ■ The Georgia Research Alliance (GRA) 
has made more than $600 million in 
investments, providing funding to university 
spin-offs in phases, which can include 
equity investments by the GRA Venture 
Fund of more than $1 million.
 ■ The Engine, started at MIT in 2016, 
provides affordable workspaces, access to 
specialized equipment, efficient business 
services, and patient capital to start-ups 
in biotechnology, robotics, manufacturing, 
medical devices, and energy.65 
 ■ SC Launch, a non-profit division of 
the South Carolina Research Authority, 
provides grants, loans, and direct 
investments to start-ups, along with 
mentoring and networking. Funding is  
provided through a combination of  
private donations and sales of state tax 
credits up to $6 million annually. Its  
portfolio includes 164 companies, roughly 
40 percent of which are manufacturers.66
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Incubators and accelerators, often with public 
funding support, are also an important part 
of the start-up landscape. Some, such as 
Greentown Labs in Boston, have targeted 
programs for hardware start-ups, working 
closely with the local MEP to find local 
manufacturers with production capabilities to 
partner with start-ups. Others have ties to local 
universities, especially engineering schools. 
Some include maker spaces, typically 3D 
printers but sometimes other CNC machine 
tools, that start-ups can use to perfect 
prototypes and address manufacturing issues. 
The support and infrastructure provided by 
incubators can help hardware start-ups make 
progress faster, but they still face issues in 
scaling production, which is often most easily 
done in China.
Corporate venture capital (CVC) funds are 
also becoming more common among large 
manufacturing companies. More than 1,000 
CVCs were active in 2017 with the 10 most 
active being Google Ventures, Intel Capital, 
Salesforce Ventures, Qualcomm Ventures, GE 
Ventures, and Microsoft Ventures. Two Chinese 
funds, Legend Capital and Fosun RZ Capital, 
and two South Korean funds, K Cube Ventures 
and Samsung Ventures, round out the top 10.67 
Within specific sectors, such as autonomous 
vehicles, the CVC funds of large suppliers, 
including Bosch, Delphi, and Magna, have 
made investments and acquisitions in the full 
range of relevant technologies: radar, lidar, and 
optical sensors; artificial intelligence and data 
analysis software for autonomy; and connected 
vehicle cybersecurity.68
Even including the investments by public and 
corporate funds, hardware start-ups receive 
much less attention and less funding than firms 
in other sectors, especially relevant to the 
67 CB Insights. (2018, February 28). The most active corporate VC firms globally. Retrieved from https://www.cbinsights.
com/research/corporate-venture-capital-active-2014/
68 Ibid.
capital needed to scale production to 
commercial volumes. It is evident that, at least 
for hardware start-ups, the U.S. system of 
starting companies based on publicly funded 
research results, simply does not work. Despite 
fundraising innovations such as Kickstarter 
and other crowdfunding mechanisms, 
expecting hardware start-ups to raise seed, 
angel, and venture funding to perfect their 
product, and then raise more funds to fully 
commercialize the product with production 
in the United States is a tall order that few 
achieve.
Insufficient capital is available for hardware 
companies; in too many cases, needed 
production expertise and capacity are not  
obtainable because of the lost Industrial 
Commons; and inputs such as components,  
subassemblies, and test equipment are not 
available domestically. To build production  
capacity in the United States, the best option 
often is to sell to larger American manufacturers, 
but this option is only available if the start-up’s 
product or technology meets a need of a larger 
firm. Many do not. Too frequently, the easiest 
option is to move production offshore, usually to 
China.
All of these breaks in the national innovation 
cycle mean that the United States is failing to 
capture all of the national wealth that 
should be created from what remains the 
world’s largest national investment in R&D. In 
fact, U.S. R&D is benefiting the manufacturing 
sectors of competing nations. With a clear 
recognition of these leakages in the innovation 
cycle, targeted investments are necessary to fix 
the cycle, commensurate with the importance 
to future national security and economic 
prosperity. 
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TRANSFORMATIONAL 
MANUFACTURING 
TECHNOLOGIES
The emergence of new technologies is creating 
opportunities, perhaps even an imperative, to 
rebuild U.S. manufacturing competitiveness 
in advanced technologies. Cross-cutting 
technologies and advanced materials are 
impacting multiple industries in ways that 
advantage domestic production. At the same 
time, product and process technology shifts 
in specific advanced industries, including 
pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, are 
creating opportunities to leapfrog existing 
standard practice. Successful firms will be 
capable of rapidly adapting their physical and 
intellectual infrastructures to exploit changes 
in technology as manufacturing becomes 
faster and more responsive to changing 
global markets. With supportive government 
policies and appropriate investments, U.S. 
manufacturing can regain leadership, rebuild 
the Industrial Commons, capture all the 
benefits from the nation’s R&D spending, 
and comprehensively meet national security 
requirements.
Smart Manufacturing
The broadest and most impactful transformative 
change affecting manufacturing is the 
application of powerful computing, networking, 
sensing, data analytics, machine learning, 
and artificial intelligence. Collectively known 
under various monikers—Smart Manufacturing, 
Industry 4.0, Industrial Internet of Things 
(IIOT)—the digitalization of manufacturing 
is creating profound shifts in where and 
how production is done and participation in 
global value chains. Combined with advanced 
materials, nanotechnology, sustainability, rapid 
product cycles, and other market forces, future 
manufacturing will be vastly different from the 
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mass production, cost minimization strategies 
that have driven decisions for the past three 
decades. Smart manufacturing creates the 
opportunity to re-establish domestic production 
in advanced industries, providing competitive 
advantages from increased efficiency, security, 
rapid response to customer demand, and new 
product features incorporating sustainability 
and resource optimization. Value will be 
derived from time to market, response to 
demand changes, inventory optimization, 
asset utilization, resources optimization, 
and quality improvement, rather than the 
simple cost minimization strategies that have 
driven offshore production. The challenge 
for U.S. industry will be to deploy the relevant 
technologies quickly and effectively and to 
adapt business models to take advantage of 
these new capabilities.
Smart manufacturing encompasses a range 
of technologies implemented on the factory 
floor, in the communication networks between 
producers and consumers to integrate supply 
chains, and in all the logistics, financial, and 
management systems that pervade all levels 
of industrial production. A few of the critical 
technologies include:
Product development: Sophisticated 
computer-aided engineering tools, including 
optimization, design for manufacturing, 
material selection and certification, statistical 
design of experiments, data analytics and 
virtual reality tools are increasingly used to 
design and develop new products to reduce 
product introduction failures, reduce product 
development costs and to meet custom market 
niches. Accelerating product development is the 
top priority, so far, for firms using 3D printing.69 
Incorporating smart technology features into 
69 Sculpteo. (2018). The State of 3D Printing 2017. Retrieved from https://www.sculpteo.com/media/ebook/State_
of_3DP_2018.pdf
70 https://www.xometry.com/; https://www.protolabs.com/; https://www.fictiv.com/
71 Breitgand, D. (2014). Collaborative manufacturing as a service in the cloud. IBM Research. Retrieved from https://www.
ibm.com/blogs/research/2014/12/collaborative-manufacturing-as-a-service-in-the-cloud/
products will also be important as connectivity, 
self awareness, and interactivity become 
expected by consumers.
Distributed manufacturing: Contract
manufacturing using Asian contractors has
become standard operating procedure in
electronics and other industries, and machine 
shops used to make parts have always been a 
major part of supply chains. However, advances 
in production technologies, such as rapid 
injection molding, additive manufacturing and 
CNC milling (subtractive manufacturing) are
expanding opportunities for local production of 
custom parts and final products. Companies 
such as Xometry, based in Maryland, ProtoLabs, 
based in Minnesota, and Fictiv in San Francisco 
offer on-demand manufacturing services 
based on digital part designs uploaded by 
customers.70 Software Defined Manufacturing 
is an emerging cloud-based distributed 
manufacturing concept, supported by IBM and 
others, in which a part design is shared with a
community of manufacturers who identify an
optimal producer that can meet time and
volume requirements.71
Integration of Operational Technology (OT)
and Information Technology (IT): OT/IT
integration is central to smart manufacturing.
Multiple benefits include dramatic increases
in capacity utilization, from a current average 
of roughly 60 to 85 percent and more. Sensors 
on production equipment (often retrofittable) 
tracking parameters such as temperature, 
vibration, and current load, combined with 
effective analysis of the resulting data, are 
enhancing predictive maintenance resulting 
in much higher machine uptime. For example, 
a  Michigan manufacturer increased uptime 
20 percent by applying sensors to monitor tool 
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wear on the shop floor.72 New business models 
are also emerging in which equipment providers
use performance-based contracting to 
guarantee uptime, enabled because of the
data generated by the sensor-laden equipment.
Edge Computing: To take advantage of the
computational power of cloud computing while
avoiding its inherent latency, edge computing 
is emerging as a an effective means to 
process sensor data locally for real-time 
production control, then, when necessary, 
passing batch data to the cloud for in-
depth analysis. Companies such as Saguna 
Networks specialize in edge computing. Other 
firms, such as Mocana73 and Rubicon Labs74 
(both in San Francisco), specialize in secure 
communications from sensors and industrial 
control systems to the cloud to address 
cybersecurity issues.
Automation and robotics: Industrial robots 
are experiencing rapid advances in capabilities 
due to improved sensors, manipulators, control 
systems, connectivity, and processing power. 
Currently, three-quarters of industrial robots 
are used in just four industries: transportation 
equipment, machinery, computers and 
electronics, and electrical equipment, 
appliances, and components. Roughly 80 
percent are used in five countries: China, 
Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United 
States, with China significantly ahead. Use of 
industrial robots has grown nearly 20 percent in  
 
72 Hitch, J. (2018, March 22). Adopt or Die: AI Leaves Manufacturing No Choice. Industry Week. Retrieved from http://
www.industryweek.com/technology-and-iiot/adopt-or-die-ai-leaves-manufacturing-no-choice
73 https://www.mocana.com
74 https://www.rubiconlabs.io
75 International Federation of Robotics. (2017). World Robotics 2017 Industrial Robots. Retrieved from https://ifr.org/free-
downloads/ 
76 Robotic Industries Association. (2018, February 26). Robotics, vision and motion control industries set new growth 
records in 2017. Robotics Online. Retrieved from https://www.robotics.org/content-detail.cfm/Industrial-Robotics-News/
Robotics-Vision-and-Motion-Control-Industries-Set-New-Growth-Records-in-2017/content_id/7019
77 Universal Robots A/S. (2017, July 20). Universal robots saves 9 hours of production time at Glidewell Laboratories. 
Robotics Online. Retrieved from https://www.robotics.org/content-detail.cfm/Industrial-Robotics-Case-Studies/Universal-
Robots-Saves-9-Hours-of-Production-Time-at-Glidewell-Laboratories/content_id/6638
78 Canaday, H. (2018, May 14). UTC aerospace working vigorously on additive metal parts. MRO Network. Retrieved from 
http://www.mro-network.com/manufacturing-distribution/utc-aerospace-working-vigorously-additive-metal-parts
recent years, with most of that growth in Asia.75 
However, U.S. shipments of industrial robots 
reached a record high in 2017 and continued 
strong performance through early 2018.76 
One recent innovation is collaborative robots 
(“cobots”), easily reprogrammable robots that 
work alongside production staff without being 
enclosed in a safety cage. Rethink Robotics,
headquartered in Boston, is a leading cobot
manufacturer with easy-to-train, quickly
deployable robots used in a wide range of
applications and industries including
packaging, machining, and inspection.
Relatively inexpensive, one manufacturer
estimates that its robots pay for themselves
in less than 200 days.77 
Additive manufacturing: Also known as 3D 
printing, additive manufacturing is beginning 
to move from models and basic prototypes to 
production of parts with complex geometries. 
The additive manufacturing industry is making 
strides toward mass production applications, 
which will have broad impacts on tooling costs, 
materials, supply chains, and logistics. GE 
Aircraft Engines, for example, has used metal 
additive manufacturing to reduce part counts 
and build an engine that is 15 percent more 
fuel efficient. UTC Aerospace Systems is using 
metal additive manufacturing across a range of 
materials to reduce weight, part counts and lead 
times up to 80 percent.78 Adidas has partnered 
with Carbon to mass produce 3D-printed 
custom shoes. General Motors is working with  
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Autodesk to increase the number of production-
ready parts made with additive technology. 
For example, a 3D-printed stainless steel seat 
bracket is 40 percent lighter and 20 percent 
stronger than its predecessor, replacing eight 
components and multiple suppliers with just 
one.79 A number of start-ups promise to increase 
the catalog of materials that can be used in 
additive manufacturing including a broader 
range of metals and carbon fiber composites.80
New business models are emerging, based on 
many of these technologies, that allow SMMs 
to access powerful tools such as modeling and 
simulation on a pay-per-use basis, lowering 
cost, simplifying access, and increasing 
flexibility. The computational power of the 
cloud eliminates the need for specialized 
and expensive hardware and software, 
thereby lowering barriers to entry for SMMs. 
Intelligent design tools are one emerging 
technology available through the cloud, in 
which the software detects design aspects 
that are not manufacturable and suggests 
alternate solutions or, in some cases, only 
creates designs that are easily manufacturable. 
Autodesk‘s Simulation 360 is one such example.
Other business models are also emerging that 
provide an opportunity to regain domestic 
production in the context of a changing 
manufacturing environment. For example, 
Manufacturing as a Service (MaaS) takes 
contract manufacturing steps further, relying 
on shared use of a networked manufacturing 
infrastructure. As more manufacturing 
infrastructure—everything from design software, 
production planning, and equipment—becomes 
networked, demand for more products of 
79 Carey, N. (2018, May 3). GM bets on 3D printers for cheaper and lighter car parts. Reuters. Retrieved from 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-general-motors-parts/gm-bets-on-3d-printers-for-cheaper-and-lighter-car-parts-
idUSKBN1I408K
80 CB Insights. (2017, December 28). Corporate investments drive a new wave of industrial 3D printing. Retrieved from 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/corporate-investment-industrial-3d-printing/
81 Wessner, C., and Howell, T. (2018). Partnering to Grow the New York Regional Nano-Cluster, Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University.
more variety can be met without owning any 
producing equipment.  The results should be 
lower costs, greater machine utilization, more 
capacity, and more options for materials use, 
product features, and cost-effective low-volume 
custom production.
Disruptive technologies in individual industries 
are also creating opportunities for the United 
States to establish, or re-establish, strong 
positions. In some cases, these technologies 
are in industries with important national security 
implications, such as semiconductors and 
pharmaceuticals.
System-in-Package
Semiconductor packaging moved offshore 
in the 1980s because it was labor intensive. 
Now fully automated, emerging packaging 
technologies, System-in-Package (SiP), are 
creating an opportunity to restore domestic 
packaging operations, a big step in recapturing 
control of the advanced semiconductor value 
chain.
Currently Intel and GLOBALFOUNDRIES 
operate the most advanced semiconductor 
fabs in the United States; both ship completed 
silicon wafers to Asia for packaging. Continuing 
progress in reducing feature sizes, with the 
frontier now at 7 nanometers and below, 
integration of multiple functions as System-on-
Chip (SoC), and three-dimensional integrated 
circuits are all defining the state of the art.81 SiP 
is a complementary technology to SoC in which 
multiple silicon chips are placed in a single 
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package and connected using wire bonds or 
solder bumps to reduce the overall system 
size. Firms such as Apple are using SiPs to mix 
multiple components—central processors, logic, 
analog, and memory—into a single package.82
Packaging started as a manual process, but 
is now largely automated. It continues to be 
located in Asia because of the experience 
base—the Industrial Commons for this activity—
resides in the leading packaging firms that 
have refined processes since the 1980s. The 
emergence of SiP and continued advances 
in the technology creates an opportunity 
to re-establish packaging capability in the 
United States as existing packaging facilities 
become obsolete. With appropriate incentives, 
SiP operations could be built near U.S. existing 
fabs, which could then create advantages 
to establishing circuit board assembly 
plants nearby, too. By taking advantage of a 
discontinuous technology, SiP, much more of 
the semiconductor value chain could be rebuilt 
in this country with positive impacts on defense 
electronics and most other hardware sectors as 
digitalization becomes pervasive.
Continuous Manufacturing of 
Pharmaceuticals
Solid format pharmaceuticals are typically a 
batch production process. Combinations of 
active and inert ingredients are combined 
in carefully measured proportions, then fed 
into pill-forming or capsule-filling machines to 
prepare batches of final product. Many steps 
in this batch production process take time 
and create the possibility of mistakes. Multiple 
82 Shih, W. (2018). Can an integrated semiconductor manufacturing capability be restored in the United States? 
Unpublished manuscript. Harvard Business School, Cambridge, MA.
83 http://www.csops.org/
84 FDA. (2017). Advancement of emerging technology applications for pharmaceutical innovation and modernization, 
guidance for industry. Retrieved from https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/UCM478821.pdf
production lines increase the volume and 
variety of production, but also multiply the risk of 
quality defects. Plus, mixers, feeders, and other 
equipment must be cleaned between batches 
to avoid cross-product contamination. Batch 
production is relatively labor-intensive, which 
helps to explain why so much manufacturing, 
especially of generic drugs, is done in China 
and India.
Continuous manufacturing (CM) methods for 
powder-based pharmaceuticals eliminates 
batch processing for much faster, more 
reliable production through an uninterrupted 
process. CM can shorten production times, 
allows for more precise production control, and 
reduces the likelihood of errors and production 
breakdowns. The technology can be used for 
an entire production process or for specific 
operations within a larger process. The Center 
for Structured Organic Particulate Systems 
(C-SOPS) at Rutgers University, in partnership 
with other universities and industry, has been a 
leader in the development of CM technology.83 
Congress recognized the potential offered 
by CM for drug production, enacting the “21st 
Century Cures Act” in 2016, which authorized 
grants to support continued development of 
CM. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
encourages firms to adopt CM, provides 
technical assistance, and has issued guidance 
to industry wanting to implement CM and 
other technologies.84 A growing number of 
manufacturers, including Lilly, Vertex, and 
Janssen Pharmaceutical Companies, are 
using CM. As precision medicine and rapid 
response to patient needs become more 
important, CM can create competitive 
advantages for domestic production of 
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pharmaceuticals and, in the future, other 
high-value chemicals. 
These are just a sample of the technologies 
already in use or emerging that will have 
profound effects on where, how, and how much 
manufacturing takes place. The United States 
has an opportunity to take a leadership 
role, especially since many of these 
technologies rely on U.S. strengths in design, 
software, and networking. But capturing 
the competitive advantages requires broad-
based dissemination and implementation 
of the enabling technologies. Although 
there is strong evidence that implementation 
of smart technologies exceeds expectations 
for efficiency gains and return on investment, 
relatively few manufacturers have made serious 
inroads to implementation. Lack of knowledge, 
fear, skill availability, and focus on the daily 
pressures to meet production targets prevent 
SMEs from moving more rapidly. 
Leadership in smart manufacturing should 
be considered a national priority and should 
be addressed with targeted programs and 
policies that will accelerate implementation. 
These would include mobilizing expertise; 
providing financial resources to buy technology; 
accelerating development of needed standards; 
and identifying a clear glide path for technology 
implementation appropriate for different firms 
in different industries of different sizes. Federal, 
state, and local governments have a role, along 
with trade associations and other industry 
groups. Some are already making strong 
contributions. Automation Alley in the Detroit 
region is one example.85
Because smart manufacturing will eventually be 
pervasive and essential to both national 
85 https://www.automationalley.com/
economic strength and national defense, it 
is important that the enabling technologies 
be produced domestically, including not only 
design but also manufacturing. Sensors, 
controllers, networking, and the other hardware 
requirements for data analysis and machine 
intelligence are too important to rely on foreign 
sources. From a security perspective the same 
principles currently being applied to drones and 
telecommunications equipment from Chinese 
providers ZTE and Huawei should be applied to 
smart manufacturing. From a competitiveness 
perspective, these smart manufacturing 
technologies will evolve and the most effective 
way to ensure both continuous improvement 
and first mover advantages in technology 
implementation will be to manufacture the 
enabling electronics domestically. 
U.S. manufacturing needs to get in front of 
the wave of change created by disruptive 
technologies. Markets are changing as 
consumers want instant gratification. Intelligent 
technology is pervading whole sectors:  
autonomous vehicles, drones, distributed 
energy and intelligent grids, and all areas 
of defense production, to name a few. The 
United States has been ahead in performing 
the research that creates the technologies 
that enables all of these changes, but has 
not maintained production capabilities to 
capture global markets, value added, and 
wealth creation. This failure has impacted the 
long-term health of the economy and national 
security. By increasing the pipeline of 
new products, investing in the necessary 
manufacturing capabilities to make those 
new products, and incentivizing broad-based 
implementation of smart manufacturing 
technologies, the United States can recapture 
its manufacturing leadership.
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BOLD STRATEGY AND 
CRITICAL NEXT STEPS
U.S. manufacturing is on the cusp of a new 
era. In contrast to recent decades in which the 
focus has been on globalization, cost reduction, 
and lean production, the coming decades 
promise a much more responsive, flexible, and 
intelligent manufacturing sector. Advances in 
a myriad of technologies ranging from high-
performance materials to ubiquitous sensors, 
from self-correcting robots to autonomous 
factories, will transform both products and 
processes. The United States is well-placed 
to take advantage of the opportunities created 
by these technological advances, building 
on strengths in research at world-class 
universities, software development, systems 
integration, creativity, and innovation. But 
taking advantage and recapturing industrial 
leadership will require national recognition of 
the importance of manufacturing and a focus 
on building the industries of the future.
Unlike many competing nations, the United 
States does not have a national manufacturing 
strategy. Countries such as Germany, South 
Korea, Japan, and China have manufacturing 
strategies with long-term R&D programs, 
investments in infrastructure, and national 
goals for specific industries. The details vary, 
but common themes include maintaining a 
strong industrial research infrastructure and 
vocational education system, and building 
sustained competitive advantage in important 
export industries. Public-private partnerships 
are usually important mechanisms. Although 
the United States has many government 
programs, at both the state and federal 
levels, they are neither coordinated nor 
funded to translate basic research into 
U.S-based manufacturing, do not include 
meaningful metrics, and tend to devolve 
to short-term problem solving rather than 
long-term strategy. Most federal S&T agencies 
do not invest in manufacturing research to 
advance process technologies and innovations 
in manufacturing machines and equipment. 
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Instead, the U.S. approach relies on market-
based decisions, which for most large 
manufacturers, have been based on cost 
reduction and quarterly earnings. Over time, 
the result of myriad decisions has resulted in a 
“hollowing out” of U.S. industry as production 
was moved offshore. U.S. manufacturers first 
moved to reduce labor costs, then to build 
production in growing foreign markets, and 
then to take advantage of skills and supplier 
capabilities that are often in short supply 
here. The long-term negative ramifications 
of this shift of production abroad are now 
apparent, creating a number of “grand 
challenges” that must be addressed to restore 
U.S. manufacturing, especially in advanced 
technologies critical to national security 
and prosperity. These manufacturing grand 
challenges include: 
1.  Rebuild the Industrial Commons 
The United States has lost fundamental 
production skill and capabilities—the Industrial 
Commons—in many industries and has lost 
entire industrial sectors, with noticeable impacts 
on the national innovation system and growing 
adverse effects on the defense industrial 
base.86 Production can provide competitive 
advantages that are difficult to copy and have 
long-term sustainability. Maintaining domestic 
manufacturing capabilities is essential to 
retaining the know-how needed to produce next 
generation technologies, and to retaining critical 
defense production. 
2.  Convert national R&D to national wealth 
and security 
Leading the world in R&D spending is not 
sufficient to ensure prosperity. Technologies 
invented here are being licensed, sold, or 
given away to manufacture overseas, which, in 
effect, is subsidizing R&D for other countries. 
86 For recent examples, see Mehta, A. (2018, May 22). America’s industrial base is at risk, and the military may feel the 
consequences. Defense News. Retrieved from https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/05/22/americas-industrial-
base-is-at-risk-and-the-military-may-feel-the-consequences/
The results of R&D must create new products, 
including defense critical technology products, 
that can be made in America at commercial 
scale to generate wealth, jobs, and exports.  
3.  Lead emerging industries 
To ensure future economic strength and 
defense superiority, the United States must 
have a leadership position in emerging 
industries such as autonomous vehicles, 
robotics, metal-additive manufacturing, bio-
manufacturing, energy storage, advanced 
materials, and quantum computing, to name 
a few. Dependence on foreign suppliers, 
regardless of how much cheaper they may be, 
is creating defense vulnerabilities and long-term 
competitive disadvantages.
Bold steps are needed to ensure that these 
challenges are met quickly and vigorously. 
Market forces alone are unlikely to achieve the 
needed change. They have not so far. With 
sustained, strategic investments, the United 
States can regain fundamental manufacturing 
capabilities, ensure a return on federal 
investments in R&D, capitalize on technology 
changes broadly affecting manufacturing, 
establish leadership in new industries, and 
restore the broad-based supplier networks that 
are essential to economic and national security.
Restoring U.S. manufacturing leadership and, 
perhaps more importantly, restoring the nation’s 
ability to capture wealth from the national 
innovation system with a robust manufacturing 
base, is a challenge to both the private and 
public sectors. Manufacturers, driven by 
short-term financial incentives, primarily focus 
on the current product development through 
incremental innovation while abandoning the 
long-term translational R&D needed to mature 
basic research results into a “next big thing.” 
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Only government can overcome this market 
failure and enable  the United States to remain 
globally competitive.
The nation must be aggressive in meeting 
the grand challenges and pursuing the 
opportunities created by rapid technological 
change, for the sake of wealth creation and 
national security. Rebuilding the Industrial 
Commons, performing the translational research 
necessary to fully commercialize basic research 
results, and incentivizing the widespread 
adoption of smart manufacturing and other 
advanced technologies are all areas in which 
the role of government is paramount. A few 
new programs will not suffice; they haven’t in 
the past. Bold new initiatives with long-term 
commitment will make the difference.
Paramount for government is to make 
investments in manufacturing research, 
process technologies and innovation, and 
systems engineering. The impact will be:
 ■ wealth is created from public R&D;87 
 ■ domestic industry, especially SMMs, 
implements advanced technologies faster 
than foreign competitors; 
 ■ defense production capabilities are 
maintained and foreign dependence 
minimized; and 
 ■ the skills and knowledge needed at all 
levels of industry and the national research 
enterprise are readily available. 
Critical Next Steps
The United States needs a broad national 
conversation to identify the necessary steps 
to achieve these objectives. MForesight 
hosted a series of roundtables in early 2018 to 
87 The goal is to advance both Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) and Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs).
begin this conversation, attended by diverse 
stakeholders from business, government, 
and academia. These discussions generated 
a number of promising ideas to address the 
grand challenges that were identified at the 
roundtables. A summary of actionable next 
steps that the nation needs to take to overcome 
the grand challenges follows.
Invest in Translational R&D and 
Manufacturing Innovation
Restoring the ability to generate wealth from the 
billions invested in R&D should be a national 
priority. The innovation cycle that converts R&D 
results—new inventions and discoveries—
into successful commercial products is 
working well in software, but has multiple 
breakdowns for manufactured hardware. 
Funding for the translational research needed 
to develop operational prototypes, demonstrate 
manufacturability, and identify viable markets 
is frequently unavailable so promising 
technologies languish in laboratories. Funding 
and expertise is needed to address the needs 
and ensure domestic production. This gap is so 
significant and the potential results so important 
that roundtable participants suggested creating 
Translational Research Centers (TRCs). 
TRCs would typically be independent non-profit 
corporations affiliated with a single or group of 
universities with strong industrial involvement. 
They would combine funding with expertise in 
product development, engineering, production, 
marketing, and other business functions 
needed to identify and nurture promising 
research results into commercial products and 
processes manufactured in this country. TRCs 
would provide skills that academic researchers 
usually do not have, help to lower the risk of 
commercialization and thereby attract private 
investment, and create a stronger pipeline from 
academic R&D to new products with positive 
impacts on national security and economic 
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prosperity. Appendix A provides additional 
details on the TRC concept.
 
Mechanisms are also needed to ensure 
that needed advances in manufacturing 
technologies are developed and implemented 
domestically. Advancing the Manufacturing 
Readiness Level of a technology is often an 
essential step in reducing technical risk and 
attracting the private investment needed for 
full-scale manufacturing. In some cases, new 
manufacturing processes are necessary; 
in others, known processes can be used to 
demonstrate manufacturability, quality, and 
cost effectiveness. Several Manufacturing 
USA institutes are developing technologies 
for production of power electronics, functional 
fabrics, flexible electronics, and other critical 
technologies. Similar opportunities will continue 
to emerge from NSF-funded Engineering 
Research Centers, national laboratories, and 
even private companies working in areas such 
as autonomous vehicle sensors and control 
systems, advanced energy storage, and 5G 
equipment. In all cases, investments in applied 
engineering and manufacturing process 
research, coordinated with the translational 
research done at the TRCs would increase the 
likelihood of creating long-term competitive 
advantages that are difficult to copy. 
One approach to advancing MRLs proposed 
by the roundtable participants would be to  
establish additional Manufacturing USA 
institutes. Existing Manufacturing USA institutes 
are mostly focused on specific technologies, 
such as flexible electronics, robotics, and 
bio-pharmaceuticals. Additional institutes 
would be useful to rebuild foundational 
manufacturing know-how while, at the 
same time, advancing capabilities in platform 
manufacturing technologies for multi-industry 
applications. Areas to be addressed would 
include metal forming, joining methods and 
technologies, laser processing, and process 
technologies for cost-effective low-volume 
manufacturing, to name a few. These institutes 
would focus on continuous improvement of 
widely used manufacturing processes, and 
work closely with domestic equipment makers to 
speed technology dissemination to commercial 
industry.
Another approach would be to launch special 
competitions. Competitions have proven 
to be an effective method for generating 
creative solutions to technical challenges. 
Competitions have been used by government 
agencies such as DARPA, non-profits such 
as XPRIZE, and private manufacturers such 
as General Motors to generate creative ideas 
from a broad audience. The goal would be to 
engage researchers to focus on manufacturing 
challenges in order to create and establish 
unique manufacturing capabilities that will 
provide U.S. producers with competitive 
advantages in multiple industries. One 
approach would be to assemble a group 
of experts who would identify a number of 
“moonshots”—important, long-term national 
objectives requiring advances in manufacturing 
technology and product innovation.
Encourage Pilot Production and Scale-up
To restore domestic production and overall 
leadership in emerging industries, America 
needs to invest in advancing manufacturing 
technologies, increasing pilot production, 
and scaling up to viable commercial volume. 
The necessary investment is largely the 
responsibility of the private sector, which means 
that national policies at all levels of government 
must remain conducive to profitable domestic 
production. Without addressing specific 
economic policies, which was beyond the scope 
of the roundtable discussions, participants 
did identify opportunities to take advantage of 
emerging technology developments to regain 
domestic production capacity. For example:
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 ■ Semiconductor packaging has long 
been done offshore, a legacy of the labor 
requirements of packaging processes. 
Packaging is now automated with 
little labor content. Furthermore, new 
technologies in which multiple chips are 
packaged together as System-in-Package 
(SiP) have created an opportunity to re-
establish packaging in the United States. 
Government procurement from domestic 
sources would speed that development. 
 ■ Pharmaceutical production is 
on the verge of dramatic change 
with the emergence of continuous 
manufacturing methods for powder-based 
pharmaceuticals. The technology provides 
a mechanism to ensure cost-competitive 
domestic production of pharmaceuticals.88
In these and similar cases, government, 
especially defense, procurement contracts 
have proven to be an effective tool. Because it 
is important to create demand, not just supply, 
for advanced technologies manufactured in 
this country, the United States should leverage 
government procurement to create lead 
markets for new products and technologies. 
The federal government has a history of 
building strong national industries through a 
combination of R&D and procurement contracts. 
Aviation and the internet are obvious examples. 
Government purchase orders are an effective 
tool for companies to raise needed capital, 
both investments and loans, to initiate pilot 
or scale production domestically. Assured 
markets of sufficient scale are essential to 
successful product launches and will incentivize 
private investment necessary to create needed 
manufacturing technologies and production 
facilities.
88 Koons, C. (2018, April 11). Why we may lose generic drugs. Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-04-11/are-drug-prices-too-low
89 SMMs have 500 employees or less and comprise over 98% of U.S. manufacturing firms and over 89% of 
establishments. United States Census Bureau. (2018). 2015 SUSB Annual Data Tables by Establishment Industry. 
Retrieved from https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2015/econ/susb/2015-susb-annual.html
Although procurement contracts are an 
effective tool, they are not a universal solution. 
New mechanisms are needed to ensure that 
domestic resources are available to scale 
production here, rather than contracting 
manufacturing to Asian producers, especially 
for high-value, high-technology products. An 
opportunity exists to form geographically 
dispersed manufacturing investment funds. 
These funds could be organized as public-
private partnerships, or build on existing state 
government funds, to ensure that hardware 
start-ups have a reliable source of investment 
capital and can scale production in this country. 
The lessons learned from existing state-level 
programs should be applied to ensure effective 
use of the resources.
Empower Small and Medium-Sized 
Manufacturers
Small and medium-sized manufacturers are 
the backbone of U.S. manufacturing.89 SMMs 
are important anchors in their communities 
and critical to systems integrators. Most 
do not entertain offshoring strategies, yet 
increasingly compete with Asian producers. 
If U.S. manufacturing is to regain international 
competitiveness and take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by smart manufacturing 
technologies, SMMs will need to implement 
those technologies broadly and effectively. 
Roundtable participants recognized that multiple 
federal and state programs provide support of 
various types to SMMs, but they also suggested 
that more could be done to accelerate their 
adoption of smart manufacturing technologies, 
and to ensure that SMMs have access to 
technical skills and expertise they will need to 
be effective in the future. Suggestions to do that 
include:
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A.  Provide loan guarantees and technical 
assistance to accelerate the pace of 
modernization of SMMs including capital 
equipment and implementation of smart 
manufacturing technologies. In partnership 
with states and existing federal programs, such 
as those at the Small Business Administration, 
this program would incentivize the purchase 
of domestically manufactured equipment and 
technologies to help rebuild the domestic 
machine tool industry, and to ensure that 
critical advanced manufacturing equipment 
and components are made and deployed 
domestically.90
B.  Fund nation-wide educational and 
informational programs to ensure that 
SMMs are aware of government procurement 
opportunities, emerging domestic and export 
market opportunities, new technologies, 
and the capabilities of foreign competitors 
to facilitate better matching of domestic 
demand with domestic production. Working in 
collaboration with the Manufacturing Extension 
Partnership, such programs could accelerate 
the re-emergence of diverse, geographically 
distributed industrial ecosystems.
C.  Create a program of industry fellowships 
to pay recent engineering and management 
retirees to work with the next generation of 
manufacturing start-ups, as well as business 
incubators and technology accelerators. 
Recent retirees are an underused resource, 
and in some cases, they are moving abroad to 
coach foreign competitors. A viable domestic 
alternative to capture such expertise before it is 
lost is essential to rebuilding the manufacturing 
knowledge base.
D.  Develop simple technology licensing 
agreements to facilitate and encourage 
90 Such a program could incentivize foreign manufacturing equipment companies to create or increase U.S. production 
capacity.
91 National Science Foundation. (2018). Science & Engineering Indicators 2018. Retrieved from https://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/2018/nsb20181/
technology transfer and joint technology 
development between universities and industry, 
especially SMMs. Licensing technologies 
from universities can be overly complex and 
expensive, limiting the number of potential 
licensees. Useful models have been developed 
by some universities, which should be 
propagated nation-wide. 
Grow Domestic Engineering and Technical 
Talent
Especially, though not exclusively, in academic 
R&D, the nation is dependent on foreign 
nationals in many scientific and engineering 
fields. In 2015, foreign students received 56 
percent of engineering doctorates, 53 percent 
in mathematics and computer science, and 
44 percent in physics.91 Many factors affect 
domestic and foreign students’ decisions to 
pursue graduate degrees, including available 
financial support, strength of the job market, 
and calculations of future earning power. The 
United States is fortunate to attract foreign 
students in large numbers, but would be remiss 
in continuing to depend on them, especially 
because foreign students are increasingly 
returning to their home countries upon 
graduation.
Other skills essential to restoring the 
nation’s Industrial Commons and to effective 
implementation of smart manufacturing 
technologies require technical training, both 
broad-based and specialized. Accessing 
needed skills is frequently listed as the top 
challenge facing manufacturers in most 
industries today. Many community colleges 
have developed training programs targeting 
specific manufacturing skill requirements, often 
in concert with local manufacturers, but more 
needs to be done.
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Because human resource issues are so 
complex, the roundtable participants did not 
attempt to suggest comprehensive solutions, 
but they did identify a few initiatives that could 
improve the current situation in engineering 
and technical talent. For instance, recognizing 
the current dependence on foreign students 
in many graduate programs in STEM fields, 
roundtable participants suggested steps to 
increase the supply of domestic graduate 
students. One way would be to significantly 
increase the availability of graduate 
fellowships for qualified domestic students. 
This simple, cost-effective step would help to 
limit inadvertent transfer of R&D results offshore, 
rebuild the supply of researchers available to 
domestic industry, and, importantly, increase 
the number of highly trained scientists and 
engineers who can work in defense industries.
Roundtable discussions also addressed the 
need for a strong pipeline of technical talent 
available to SMMs. To cope with a growing 
wave of retirees and a shortage of young people 
with appropriate skills, an increasing number 
of manufacturing companies are creating 
apprentice programs and working with local 
technical schools to create custom training 
programs, often with employment guaranteed 
to successful graduates. Yet potential students 
usually are not aware of them. A useful step 
would be to create a national registry of 
apprenticeship and other industrial training 
programs with the ability to match available 
programs with high school and college students 
and veterans seeking opportunities with 
SMMs, along with funding support for trainees. 
A national registry of such programs would 
better match student interest with employment 
opportunities and contribute to restoring the 
Industrial Commons.
To complement apprenticeship programs, 
roundtable participants also identified 
the need for a renewed national focus on 
educating engineering technicians with 
emphasis on applied engineering skills. A 
frequent complaint among manufacturers is 
that engineering graduates have insufficient 
practical skills to make an immediate 
contribution to factory operations, while 
still having significant salary expectations. 
Mobilizing the broad higher education 
community to educate more engineering 
technicians would meet a growing need and 
likely attract more students and veterans to 
applied engineering. This program could be a 
three-year polytechnic degree, could provide 
scholarships to pursue cooperative education 
programs at SMMs, could be a collaboration 
between trade schools and engineering 
colleges, or could be other creative paths 
that supplement a traditional undergraduate 
engineering curriculum.
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All of these suggestions emerging from 
MForesight’s roundtables address clearly 
defined components of the grand challenges 
facing U.S. manufacturing. Ideally, the United 
States will, at some point in the future, create a 
national manufacturing strategy as international 
competitor nations have done. These ideas 
should be part of such a strategy, ideally 
implemented in a coordinated way with a single 
point of focus to orchestrate the required 
funding streams and to maintain strategic 
program management. 
Currently, multiple offices and agencies at both 
the federal and state levels of government, as 
well as a few private non-profit organizations 
and public-private partnerships, support 
technology development, but there is no single 
point of focus to provide national strategic 
direction, or to provide the cross-cutting focus 
on manufacturing and systems engineering 
needed to bridge the hardware innovation 
gap. Manufacturing cuts across multiple 
disciplines and technologies so it is therefore 
all the more compelling to have 
a single focal point for engineering and 
manufacturing research and innovation. The 
needed point of focus could take one of 
several possible forms—a publicly funded 
non-profit organization, a federal-state-industry  
partnership, or a federal office or agency. Its 
mission would be to fill the existing gaps in the 
national innovation cycle by providing funding  
for translational research to advance TRLs and 
MRLs, to help rebuild the Industrial Commons 
through strategic investments in workforce 
development, and to support hardware start-
ups with investments, loans, expertise, and 
networking to encourage production scale-up 
this country.
Manufacturing really matters. Research and 
invention alone are not enough to ensure 
national prosperity. To reap the full rewards of 
rapid technological advances, the nation must 
be able to manufacture products. Because of 
a confluence of economic and technological 
forces, the United States now has an opportunity 
to rebuild its manufacturing base and restore 
its global competitiveness. But another report 
won’t help. Bold steps commensurate with 
the scale and importance of the objectives 
are absolutely necessary. The roundtable 
participants proposed a few implementation 
options, including creating a national innovation 
initiative, establishing a national manufacturing 
innovation foundation, and establishing a 
manufacturing program within each of the 
federal S&T agencies. They fully expect 
policymakers to convene and make decisions 
on how best to implement the critical steps 
identified in the previous section. A piecemeal 
approach, addressing one or two critical 
steps but not all, will not help. Other nations 
are not standing still. The onus is on us.
IMPLEMENTATION 
STRATEGIES
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Appendix A: Translational Research Centers
One of the ideas discussed in depth at MForesight’s manufacturing roundtables is to create a number of 
Translational Research Centers (TRCs). These would be designed to address market failures, fill gaps 
in the innovation ecosystem, ensure superior defense technology and capacity, and regain a vibrant, 
competitive industrial base. 
Mission
Translational Research Centers will provide funding for product development to fill the gap between 
academic researchers with a potential hardware product or manufacturing process technology and 
domestic production. Employing professional engineers and managers experienced in new product 
introductions, the TRC will guide and fund research needed to translate laboratory results to testable 
beta prototypes and facilitate connections with domestic manufacturers to scale domestic production. 
Filling this gap will reduce the technical and market risk, attract private sector investment, retain and 
scale commercial production in the United States, and thereby multiply and accelerate the economic 
benefits from federal investments in academic research. TRCs serve as a means to translate promising 
technologies resulting from basic research conducted at affiliated universities into (hardware) products 
or processes for scaled production in the United States. 
Background
 ■ Federal R&D obligations in 2016 were $140 billion. Federal R&D spending at universities was 
nearly $40 billion. Of that, approximately $18 billion was spent on life sciences by NIH, and roughly 
$12 billion was spent on engineering research across all agencies. In 2016 alone, universities spent 
nearly $550 million on equipment for engineering research.92
 ■ Almost no government funding is currently available for the translational research needed to 
create viable hardware prototypes or to scale production, leaving many discoveries and inventions 
languishing in the laboratory or, increasingly, commercialized outside the United States.
 ■ Venture capitalists invest very little in hardware commercialization.
 ■ A small federal investment in translational research would ensure greater domestic economic 
impact from R&D funding, dramatically increasing the return to federal R&D spending. 
Existing Commercialization Process
 ■ Commercializing results of university research is dependent on licensing, but results are rarely 
developed sufficiently to demonstrate the value to a potential licensee.
 ■ University spin-off companies, start-ups established to commercialize university research, 
frequently lack rigorous product development skills and have difficulty raising sufficient capital  
 
92 National Science Foundation. (2018). Science & Engineering Indicators 2018. Retrieved from https://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/2018/nsb20181/
49
to mature hardware technologies as well as to develop (or contract) needed manufacturing 
processes.
 ■ Venture capitalists (VCs) limit investments in hardware start-ups because the risk profile is 
multifaceted and hardware overall is more risky, time consuming, and expensive than software. VCs 
invest less than 5 percent in hardware start-ups. Some states and universities have created small 
VC funds for university start-ups, but even these favor information technology and healthcare start-
ups. 
 ■ The result is that potentially promising research results do not receive additional effort to create 
commercial hardware products because funds are not available. The national wealth that could be 
created from research by introducing new products and technologies is foregone or captured by 
foreign competitors. Simply creating knowledge without a means to create national wealth from that 
knowledge is not sustainable.  
Translational Research Centers
 ■ TRCs would fill a gap in the current innovation ecosystem by funding translational research and 
facilitating scale-up needed to spur commercialization of the most promising results from academic 
R&D. TRCs would fund experienced product development teams working with start-ups to develop 
commercially viable hardware prototypes, perform validation testing to demonstrate the value 
proposition, and work with U.S. manufacturers, typically small and medium-sized manufacturers, to 
identify a path to full-scale production in the United States.
 ■ TRCs would work with a single university or multiple regional universities to identify promising 
hardware technologies emerging from research results.
 ■ TRCs could take multiple possible legal forms. Although TRCs are affiliated with universities, 
they should be independent from universities, although they could be part of university research 
corporations. Most likely, they would be independent non-profit corporations. Each TRC would 
establish relationships with affiliated universities to allow sharing of license fees and royalties from 
successful products and/or processes.
 ■ Regardless of legal form, the overhead rate on federal funds would be limited to a maximum of 
15 percent.
 ■ The TRC would employ professional engineering and management staff to serve as systems 
engineers, project managers, market researchers, and private sector liaisons. Experienced product 
development teams would apply rigorous processes to specify, design, build and test hardware 
products/processes in the context of anticipated use cases to ensure timely results and high levels 
of domestic commercialization.
 ■ Any technologies funded through TRCs would be subject to simplified licensing agreements 
to encourage licensing by SMMs. Licensing of resulting products must be restricted to U.S. 
production facilities only.
 ■ Commercial production or use of resulting process technologies would be strictly limited to the 
United States to increase domestic manufacturing output and exports. 
 
50
Funding
 ■ An initial pilot program would fund 10 TRCs around the country, selected based on competitive 
proposals.
 ■ Each TRC would be funded at up to $10 million annually, for an initial 3-year award. The amount 
of funding provided would be commensurate with the associated universities’ federal research 
funding, up to 3 percent of basic research funds. 
 ■ Continued or increased funding would depend on performance as determined by an assessment 
scorecard.
Assessment Scorecard
The intent of this initiative is to mature promising results from the basic research conducted at affiliated 
universities. TRCs, in collaboration with their affiliated universities, are at liberty to choose the technology 
projects to be pursued. The results reported in the scorecard will be used to assess the effectiveness of 
the affiliated university in transitioning promising research into domestically scalable products/processes 
in the marketplace. Each TRC will be scored based on a series of leading and lagging metrics indicative 
of positive impact on the U.S. economy. Metrics would include:
 ■ Number of private sector jobs created (maximum score = 20)
 ■ Amount of private sector investment (does not include state or federal funds or university funds; 
does not include “commitments”)  (maximum score = 20)
 ■ Number of start-ups successfully scaling profitable production (maximum score = 10)
 ■ Number of U.S.-based SMMs engaged in the production, technology transfer, and/or 
development process (maximum score = 10)
 ■ Number of technologies exceeding Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 6 and Manufacturing 
Readiness Level (MRL) 5, according to standard TRL and MRL assessments used by the 
Department of Defense (maximum score = 10)
 
Continued funding would be based on the annual score achieved:
 ■ Award amount may be increased with a score above 55.
 ■ Continued funding for 2 years after the initial 3 year award requires a score above 40.
 ■ Funding would terminate at the end of the fifth year if the score is below 45.
 ■ Funding would be extended at the end of the fifth year for an additional 3 years if the score is at 
least 55.
 ■ The TRC scorecard will be used in the evaluation of all future proposals submitted by the 
participating universities.  
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Proposal Evaluation Criteria
The initial ten TRCs should be selected based on a Request for Proposals. Multiple legal structures, 
formal relationships with universities, industry and technology foci, non-federal funding sources and 
partnerships, and other characteristics should be encouraged to maximize the lessons from the pilot 
program, though the same assessment scorecard must be used for all TRCs. The initial ten TRCs should 
focus on universities, though subsequent centers could work with other recipients of federal R&D funding 
such as non-profit research institutions and national laboratories. Achieving the desired impact—real, 
measurable economic benefit to the United States—will be the ultimate determinant of success. Proposal 
evaluation criteria should be based on the likelihood that proposers can achieve that goal. 
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Appendix B: Roundtable Participants
Boston, MA (January 18, 2018)
1. Dean Bartles, Director of the John Olson Advanced Manufacturing Center - University of New 
Hampshire
2. Bill Bonvillian, Lecturer - MIT
3. Sam Feller, Founder - Awkward Engineer
4. John Hart, Associate Professor - MIT
5. Christian Hoepfner, Executive Director - Fraunhofer USA Center for Sustainable Energy 
Systems CSE
6. Micaelah Morrill, Director of the Manufacturing Initiative & Acting Executive Director - 
Greentown Labs
7. Ira Moskowitz, Director of Advanced Manufacturing Programs - Massachusetts Technology 
Collaborative
8. Venky Narayanamurti, Benjamin Peirce Professor of Technology and Public Policy at the 
Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences - Harvard University
9. Dave Rapaport, Head of Research & Collaboration Management US - Siemens Corporate 
Technology
10. Liz Reynolds, Executive Director MIT Industrial Performance Center
11. Peter Russo, Director of Growth & Innovation - MassMEP
12. Matt Sweitzer, Manufacturing Fellow - Greentown Labs
13. Jim Watkins, Professor of Polymer Science and Engineering - University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst & Director - Center for Hierarchical Manufacturing
14. Johanna Wolfson, Principal - PRIME Impact Fund
Washington, DC (January 22, 2018)
1. Rob Atkinson, President - Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
2. Norman Augustine, CEO (Ret.) - Lockheed Martin & Former Under Secretary of the Army
3. Kurt Bettenhausen, Senior Vice President - Siemens Corporate Technology USA
4. Robyn Boerstling, Vice President, Infrastructure, Innovation and Human Resources Policy - 
National Association of Manufacturers
5. Walter Copan, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and NIST Director 
- NIST
6. Ron Hira, Professor of Public Policy - Howard University & Research Associate - Economic 
Policy Institute
7. Paul Kern, Senior Counselor - Cohen Group
8. Mark Mills, Senior Fellow - Manhattan Institute
9. Shirish Pareek, CEO  - Hydraulex Global
10. Willy Shih, Robert and Jane Cizik Professor of Management Practice in Business Administration 
- Harvard Business School
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11. Jeff Wilcox, Vice President for Engineering and Program Operations - Lockheed Martin
12. Chad Moutray, Chief Economist - National Association of Manufacturers
13. Andrew Bicos, ASME Legislative Fellow - Office of U.S. Congressman Reed
14. Pramod Khargonekar, Vice Chancellor for Research and Distinguished Professor of Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science - University of California, Irvine
15. Mike Russo, Director & Corporate Lead of U.S. Government Affairs - GLOBALFOUNDRIES
Austin, TX (February 23, 2018)
1. Joe Beaman, Professor & Earnest F. Gloyna Regents Chair in Engineering - University of Texas 
at Austin
2. Roger Bonnecaze, William and Bettye Nowlin Chair in Chemical Engineering & Co-Director of 
NASCENT - University of Texas at Austin
3. Larry Dunn, Assistant Director of Industry and Innovation Programs at NASCENT - University of 
Texas at Austin
4. Brian Korgel, Professor, Edward S. Hyman Endowed Chair in Engineering - University of Texas 
at Austin & Director of Industry/University Cooperative Research Center on Next Generation 
Photovoltaics
5. Dwayne LaBrake, President and Chief Executive Officer - Canon Nanotechnologies
6. Ed Latson, Executive Director - ARMA—Austin Regional Manufacturers Association
7. Ken Pfeiffer, Vice President of Engineering - Superconductor Technologies Inc.
8. Bill Rafferty, Manager of Process Improvement Engineering - Southwest Research Institute & 
South Central Regional Director - Texas Manufacturing Assistance Center (TMAC)
9. John Randall, President - Zyvex Labs, Dallas
10. S.V. Sreenivasan, Prof. & Co-Director of the NASCENT Center - University of Texas at Austin
11. Krishna Srinivasan, Founding General Partner - LiveOak Ventures
12. Bill Stueve, President - Atonometrics
13. Sarah Holloway, District Field Director - Office of Congressman Michael T. McCaul (TX-10)
San Jose, CA (March 8, 2018)
1. Bob Brakeman, Independent Consultant
2. Megan Brewster, Vice President of Advanced Manufacturing - Launch Forth
3. Glenn Daehn, Fontana Professor of Materials Science Engineering & Director for 
Manufacturing, Institute for Materials Research - The Ohio State University
4. Cyril Ebersweiler, General Partner, SOSV & Managing Director, HAX
5. Mauricio Futran, Vice President, Process Science and Advanced Analytics - Johnson & 
Johnson
6. Jim Myrick, Entrepreneur in Residence - Flextronics
7. Shirish Pareek, CEO - Hydraulex Global
8. David Parrillo, Global Research & Development Director for DowDuPont Packaging and 
Specialty Plastics - The Dow Chemical Company
9. Sean Randolph, Senior Director - Bay Area Council Economic Institute
10. Greg Reichow, Partner - Eclipse Ventures
11. Mike Russo, Director & Corporate Lead of U.S. Government Affairs - GLOBALFOUNDRIES
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12. Randy Schiestl, Vice President, R&D, Global Technology & Services - Boston Scientific 
Corporation
13. Diego Tamburini, Principal Industry Lead for Azure Manufacturing - Microsoft
14. Malcolm Thompson, Executive Director - NextFlex
15. David Vasko, Director of Advanced Technology - Rockwell Automation
16. David Wahl, Senior Vice President and General Manager - Jabil
Raleigh, NC (March 14, 2018)
1. Paul Cohen, Woolard Distinguished Professor, Fitts Department of Industrial and Systems 
Engineering - North Carolina State University
2. Steve Ellis, CEO - Automated Solutions
3. John Hardin, Executive Director - North Carolina Board of Science, Technology & Innovation
4. Nick Justice, Executive Director - PowerAmerica Institute
5. Russell King, Foscue Distinguished Professor & Co-Director of the Center for Additive 
Manufacturing and Logistics - North Carolina State University
6. John Loyack, Vice President of Global Business Services - Economic Development Partnership 
of North Carolina
7. Mike Mazzola, Director of the Energy Production and Infrastructure Center - University of North 
Carolina at Charlotte
8. Steve McManus, Innovation Manager - RTI
9. Phil Mintz, Executive Director - NC State Industry Expansion Solutions & Director - North 
Carolina MEP
10. Zack Oliver, Economist - RTI
11. Scott Smith, Professor & Department Chair, Mechanical Engineering and Engineering Science 
- University of North Carolina at Charlotte
12. Binil Starly, Associate Professor, Industrial and Systems Engineering - North Carolina State 
University 
13. Bob Wilhelm, Vice Chancellor for Research and Economic Development - University of North 
Carolina at Charlotte
14. Fiona Baxter, Associate Executive Director - NC State Industry Expansion Solutions
Indianapolis, IN (March 21, 2018)
1. Keith Belton, Director of the Manufacturing Policy Initiative - Indiana University Bloomington
2. Andrew Berger, Senior Vice President of Governmental Affairs - Indiana Manufacturers 
Association
3. Matt Conrad, Executive Director, Indiana Automotive Council - Conexus Indiana
4. Claudia Cummings, Vice President, Strategic Development - Conexus Indiana
5. Jennifer Hagan-Dier, Manufacturing Extension Partnership Director, Center for Industrial 
Services - University of Tennessee
6. Ned Hill, Professor of Public Administration and City & Regional Planning - The Ohio State 
University
7. Steve Jones, Professor of Finance, Kelly School of Business - IUPUI
8. Razi Nalim, Associate Dean for Research, School of Engineering and Technology - IUPUI
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9. Clayton Nicholas, Industry Research Development Specialist, School of Engineering and 
Technology - IUPUI
10. Ray Niehaus, Managing Director of Innovation and Technology - Mid-America Science Park
11. Dave Roberts, Chief Innovation Officer - Indiana Economic Development Corporation
12. Dave Snow, Director - Indiana MEP
13. Stan Woszczynski, Vice President, Chief Manufacturing Officer - Cummins, Inc.
14. James Ruble, Advanced Composites Outreach Consultant, Center for Industrial Services - 
University of Tennessee
15. Tim Frazier, Executive Director of Advanced Engineering - Cummins, Inc.
Dearborn, MI (March 29, 2018)
1. Carla Bailo, President and CEO - Center for Automotive Research
2. Timothy Bartik, Senior Economist - Upjohn Institute
3. Mike Coast, President - Michigan Manufacturing Technology Center
4. Chris Conrardy, Executive Director - LIFT & Chief Technology Officer and Vice President for 
Strategic Initiatives - EWI
5. Chuck Hadden, President & CEO, Michigan Manufacturers Association
6. Fred Keller, Founder and Chair, Cascade Engineering
7. Tom Kelly, Executive Director and CEO, Automation Alley
8. Jeff Krause, Executive Director and CEO, SME
9. Andrew McColm, Managing Director, Venture Creation - Spartan Innovations
10. Mark Montone, Director of Sales and Marketing North America - Lacks Trim Systems LLC
11. David Ollila, President and Chief Innovation Officer - Skypoint Ventures
12. Kirk Roys, Director of Global Technical Services - Steelcase
13. Ryan Sekol, Senior Researcher, Manufacturing Systems Research - General Motors Global 
Research and Development
14. Kelly Sexton, Associate Vice President for Research - Technology Transfer and Innovation 
Partnerships - University of Michigan
15. Dan Slane, Owner - The Slane Company
16. Alan Taub, Chief Technical Officer - LIFT
Other Contributors
1.     Christie Wong-Barrett, CEO, MacArthur Corp.
2.     Glenn Daehn, Mars G. Fontana Prof. of Metallurgical Engineering, The Ohio State University
3.     Khershed Cooper, Program Director, Nanomanufacturing, National Science Foundation
4.     Charles L. Cooney, Robert T. Haslam (1911) Professor of Chemical Engineering, Emeritus,
        and Faculty Director, Emeritus, Deshpande Center for Technological Innovation, MIT
5.     Lawrence D. Burns, Vice President (retired), R&D, General Motors
6.     Pat McGibbon, Vice President, Association for Manufacturing Technology
7.     Kirsten Rieth, Senior Innovation Advisor, RTI
8.     Madhav Acharya, Technology-to-Market Advisor, ARPA-E
9.     Charles Zukoski. Provost, University at Buffalo
10.   Sue Babinec, Senior Commercialization Advisor, ARPA-E, Dept. of Energy
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